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NEW ISSUES IN THE LAW  
OF DEMOCRACY 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CODES AFTER REPUBLICAN  
PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE 
RICHARD BRIFFAULT† 
INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject to 
election.  The votes of the people select or retain at least some judges in 
thirty-nine states, and all judges are elected in twenty-one states.1  By one 
count, 87% of the state and local judges in the United States have to face the 
voters at some point if they want to win or remain in office.2  Judicial elec-
tions, however, differ from elections for legislative or executive offices in a 
number of significant ways.  In nineteen states, most judges are initially ap-
pointed but must later go before the voters in a so-called retention elec-
tion—in which there is no competing candidate but voters are asked simply 
whether they approve of the incumbent—in order to keep their positions.3  
In twenty of the states that provide for electoral contests between competing 
judicial candidates, some or all judicial elections are nonpartisan, even 
though candidates for other state offices are elected on party lines.4  Most 
strikingly, virtually all states that provide for judicial elections also impose 
campaign codes that restrict the election-related activities of judicial candi-
 
 † Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University 
School of Law. 
1 See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES:  APPELLATE AND 
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS 3, 7-14 (2004) (charting the methods of judicial selection 
and retention for all fifty states), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/Judicial 
SelectionCharts.pdf (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
2 Robert C. Berness, Note, Norms of Judicial Behavior:  Understanding Restrictions on 
Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1028 
(2001). 
3 AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 7-14 (noting the use of retention elections in 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
and Wyoming).  In addition, unopposed judges run for retention in Montana.  Id. at 10. 
4 Id. 
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dates to a far greater extent than these states regulate the campaigns of ex-
ecutive and legislative candidates.  Generally adopted by rule of the state’s 
highest court rather than by statute, these codes, inter alia, limit what judi-
cial candidates may say in their campaigns, restrict how they raise campaign 
contributions, and curtail their ability to engage in partisan political activi-
ties other than support for their own candidacies. 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court sharply called into question 
the constitutionality of state judicial campaign restrictions.  In Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White,5 a closely divided Supreme Court invalidated 
the provision of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that precluded ju-
dicial candidates from “announcing” their views concerning disputed legal 
and political questions.  White found that the First Amendment applies to a 
judicial campaign code and, therefore, the code’s restriction on campaign 
speech should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.  The Court cast doubt on 
the primary rationale for the campaign canons—preserving the impartiality 
and the appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary6—and expressed 
skepticism with regard to the notion that even if judicial impartiality is a 
compelling state interest, that interest may be advanced by campaign speech 
restrictions.7  Moreover, the Court emphasized the positive value of ena-
bling judicial candidates to express themselves on disputed political and le-
gal questions.  As the Court stated, those are “what the elections are about.”8 
Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion observed that “we neither 
assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial 
office to sound the same as those for legislative office,” the Court also 
pointedly declined to find that the First Amendment allows greater regula-
tion of judicial election campaigns than of other elections.9  Rather, noting 
the important lawmaking role of American courts, the majority concluded 
that the dissenters “greatly exaggerate[d] the difference between judicial 
and legislative elections.”10  White’s treatment of the judicial impartiality 
rationale and its application of the narrow tailoring requirement raise ques-
tions about whether any judicial campaign restriction could pass strict scru-
tiny.  The decision casts a shadow of unconstitutionality over the entire pro-
ject of judicial election campaign regulation. 
In the eighteen months since White, federal courts have held unconstitu-
tional a number of state judicial campaign restrictions that were not at issue 
 
5 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
6 Id. at 775-78. 
7 Id. at 779-83. 
8 Id. at 788. 
9 Id. at 783. 
10 Id. at 784. 
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in White.11  Similarly, a number of state courts have revised their canons, 
including provisions not at issue in White, to make them less restrictive.12  
To be sure, many state courts have retained their canons and have rejected 
First Amendment challenges to the restrictions on judicial campaign and 
partisan political activities that the canons impose.13  But the constitutional-
ity of the state canons that subject judicial campaigns to greater regulation 
than legislative or executive campaigns remains uncertain. 
In this Article, I will consider three questions raised by White.  First, 
does the Constitution require that all elections be run according to the same 
set of rules?  That is certainly the implication of those judges and commen-
tators who have argued that, having chosen to select or retain judges by 
election, the states must abide by the constitutional requirements that apply 
to elections.14  However, as I will discuss in Part I, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly upheld variations in the constitutional norms that govern a num-
ber of the fundamental features of elections.  Indeed, the constitutional rules 
of elections may differ according to what is at stake in the election.  If cam-
paign practices that are unexceptionable (or even constitutionally protected) 
 
11 Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on 
Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 351 F.3d 
65 (2d Cir. 2003). 
12 See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B(1) (amended Dec. 22, 2003) 
(prohibiting judicial candidates from making statements “that commit the candidate with re-
spect to cases, controversies, or issues that could come before the courts” but no longer pro-
hibiting statements that “appear to commit” the candidate).  Compare GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 7B (amended Jan. 7, 2004) (removing the prohibitions against both “pledges 
or promises” by candidates and the personal solicitation of campaign contributions), and N.C. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (amended Apr. 2, 2003) (deleting prohibitions against 
judicial candidates’ “pledges or promises” and personal solicitation of campaign funds), with 
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B (2000), and N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 7 (1998). 
13 See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that the 
state’s canons were sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 180 (2003); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 350 (Me. 2003) (concluding that canon re-
stricting speech was “narrowly tailored” to serve a compelling state interest), cert. denied, 124 
S. Ct. 1722 (2004); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (finding the 
rules restricting judicial political activity “narrowly tailored to further a number of compelling 
state interests”); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (holding “New 
York’s pledges or promises clause—essential to maintaining impartiality and the appearance 
of impartiality in the state judiciary—is sufficiently circumscribed to withstand exacting scru-
tiny under the First Amendment”). 
14 See, e.g., Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321 (“White suggests that the standard for judicial 
elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and executive elections.” (empha-
sis added)); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Campaigns in the Shadow of Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 2, 22-23 (Fall 2002) (“The First Amend-
ment . . . does not allow judges to impose restrictive rules that try to take the politics out of 
political campaign speech.  If states choose to elect judges instead of appointing them, that 
choice limits the subsequent power of the state to regulate the judicial elections.”). 
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in the context of legislative or executive elections have a distinct and harm-
ful impact on the judicial function, then they can be restricted in judicial 
election campaigns. 
Second, even if it is theoretically legitimate to apply rules to judicial 
campaigns that are more restrictive than those that govern executive and 
legislative elections, are the specific rules in the state judicial conduct codes 
constitutional?  These canons preclude judicial candidates from making 
“pledges or promises” or other statements that “commit or appear to com-
mit” candidates with respect to cases or legal issues;15 penalize misrepresen-
tations and misleading statements;16 bar judges and judicial candidates from 
personally soliciting campaign contributions;17 and restrict partisan political 
behavior.18  Although White noted that Minnesota’s “pledges or promises” 
 
15 See, e.g., Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 313 
(W.D. Ky. 1991) (“The canon . . . prohibits, in broad language, pledges and promises of con-
duct in office and commitments with respect to issues likely to come before the court.”); In re 
Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 88 (“Each of the charges . . . involved implicit pledges that if elected to 
office, Judge Kinsey would help law enforcement.”); Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal 
Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. 1994) (charging judicial candidate with violating the 
Kentucky’s Commit Clause because he promoted himself as a pro-life candidate); In re Wat-
son, 794 N.E.2d at 5 (“[P]etitioner’s campaign effectively promised that, if elected, he would 
aid law enforcement rather than apply the law neutrally and impartially in criminal cases.”). 
16 See, e.g., Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1316 (finding a misleading campaign brochure in viola-
tion of Canon 7(B)(1)(d)); Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 211 (Ala. 
2001) (charging a judicial candidate with distributing “false information” about his opponent); 
In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 958 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) (“Respondent made knowing mis-
representation about the incumbent judge’s judicial record during the course of her candidacy 
for office.”); Summe v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 43 (Ky. 1997) (de-
termining that a judicial candidate misrepresented campaign literature as an independent en-
dorsement by a newspaper); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Mich. 2000) (“[The court] 
narrow[s] the canon to prohibit a candidate from either knowingly or recklessly using forms of 
public communication that are false.”); In re Miller, 759 A.2d 455, 457 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 
2000) (“[H]e is charged with disseminating information in the course of his campaign for 
election as judge . . . which, allegedly, misrepresented his position and qualifications in viola-
tion of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.”). 
17 See, e.g., Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23 (“[C]andidates are completely chilled from 
speaking to potential contributors . . . .”); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 
944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Canon 7 . . . prohibits personal solicitation of campaign 
funds by a candidate for judicial office.”); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d at 348 (“[W]e sought to 
prevent the appearance of, or the ultimate corruption of, the judicial process by preventing 
judges from soliciting contributions in support of their own political ambitions.”); In re 
Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 32 (Or. 1990) (per curiam) (“Personal solicitation of campaign funds by 
a candidate for judicial office is forbidden by Canons 7 B(7) and 7 D of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct . . . .”); cf. Zeller v. Fla. Bar, 909 F. Supp. 1518, 1527-28 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (holding 
unconstitutional a time limitation on period for solicitation and a restriction on contributions 
to judicial candidate campaigns). 
18 See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 80 
(N.D.N.Y. 2003) (charging judicial candidate who served as keynote speaker at partisan po-
litical function with violating provisions of New York’s Code of Judicial Conduct); Suster v. 
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clause was not at issue in that case,19 two decades earlier the Court had held 
in a nonjudicial election that the First Amendment protects the freedom of 
candidates to make campaign promises.20  Moreover, even before White, the 
lower federal courts and state courts had been troubled by the canons’ penal-
ties for misrepresentations.21  Since White, two courts have invalidated restric-
tions on personal solicitation and partisan political behavior.22 
In Part II, I will sketch out a general framework for thinking about the 
regulation of election campaigns and, more specifically, of judicial election 
campaigns.  I will indicate that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
campaign regulations, even those that trench on the free speech rights of 
 
Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 704 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding as constitutional a canon forbid-
ding a judicial candidate from using funds raised for a campaign for a different elected posi-
tion); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1292 (distinguishing between furthering one’s own campaign 
and engaging in partisan activity in support of other candidates). 
19 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770 (2002). 
20 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
21 See, e.g., Butler, 802 So. 2d at 218 (suggesting the canon chills judicial speech by 
punishing unintentionally mistaken rather than intentionally false statements); In re Chmura, 
608 N.W.2d at 42 (expressing concern that the more broadly drawn canon encourages judicial 
candidates to be silent on key issues rather than risk making unintentionally misleading re-
marks); In re Miller, 759 A.2d at 471 (opining that a broad interpretation of First Amendment 
rights and a narrower reading of the canon protects the judiciary’s “image and integrity”). 
22 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321-22; Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 90.  The personal solicita-
tion and partisan behavior restrictions had also been at issue in the White litigation.  The plain-
tiffs in White had challenged the Minnesota canons that dealt with judicial candidates’ parti-
san activities and personal solicitation of funds, as well as the state’s Announce Clause.  On 
the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judg-
ment to the state defendants and upheld both the personal solicitation and partisan activity 
canons.  Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn. 1999).  The 
Eighth Circuit affirmed.  247 F.3d 854, 885 (8th Cir. 2001).  Plaintiffs sought certiorari to re-
view the Eighth Circuit’s decision upholding the partisan activity and the Announce Clause 
canons (but not review of the decision upholding the anti-personal solicitation canon), but the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari only as to the Announce Clause.  534 U.S. 1054, 1054 
(2001).  Upon holding that the Minnesota Announce Clause violated the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to respondents and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.  White, 536 U.S. at 788.  On remand, a divided Eighth Circuit 
panel adhered to the appellate court’s prior position upholding the anti-personal solicitation 
canon, 361 F.3d 1035, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 2004), but reversed the summary judgment for the 
defendants and remanded for trial on the challenge to the partisan activity restrictions, id. at 
1043-48.  The dissenter would have entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on both is-
sues.  Id. at 1049.  The panel’s treatment of the personal solicitation issue is discussed at infra 
text accompanying note 180, and its consideration of the restrictions on partisan political ac-
tivities is considered at infra text accompanying notes 207-11.  Two months after the panel 
decision, the Eighth Circuit voted to grant rehearing en banc and to vacate the panel’s opinion 
and judgment.  Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004).  As of the printing of this Article, oral argument 
of the rehearing en banc was scheduled for October 20, 2004.  Notice to All Counsel:  October 18-
24, 2004, United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit at 4, at http:// 
www.ca8.uscourts.gov/webcal/print/oct04stp.pdf (rev. Oct. 1, 2004). 
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candidates and their supporters, when those regulations promote other im-
portant values, such as improving the quality of the electoral process or en-
hancing the integrity of government.  I will suggest that the special nature of 
the judicial function can justify restrictions on campaign conduct that would 
not be constitutional in the nonjudicial setting. 
In Part III, I consider some of the specific campaign conduct canons 
that have been subject to legal challenge in recent years.  I will argue that 
restrictions on campaign “pledges or promises” and “commitments” are 
constitutional, even though comparable restrictions on legislative and ex-
ecutive candidates would be unconstitutional.  To be sure, some current ver-
sions of these restrictions are subject to challenge as vague or overly broad.  
But the basic idea that judicial candidates can be precluded from making 
statements that indicate that they have prejudged cases or issues that are 
likely to come before them as judges is sound. 
The canon dealing with misrepresentations presents a different ques-
tion.  It is difficult to see what in the nature of judging requires judges to be 
held to a higher standard of honesty than other public officials.  But it may 
be that properly defined restrictions on misrepresentations would be consti-
tutional with respect to candidates for any elected office, even if in practice 
such restrictions are aimed primarily at judicial candidates. 
Restrictions on candidates’ personal solicitation of campaign contribu-
tions and partisan political activity also ought to be treated as constitutional.  
These restrictions advance the compelling public interest in judicial imparti-
ality and independence.  Moreover, these rules affect only campaign behav-
ior.  They do not affect the content of candidates’ campaign statements and, 
thus, cut less deeply into the candidates’ freedom of expression while also 
avoiding the reduction in voter information that might result from restric-
tions on campaign statements.  As a result, these restrictions ought to be up-
held as constitutional, White notwithstanding. 
Finally, even if these canons are constitutional, the question remains 
whether they are likely to be effective in reconciling the competing goals of 
informed voter decision making, vigorous competition, and judicial imparti-
ality that together frame the debate over the regulation of judicial election 
campaigns.  My sense is that the benefits of the canons are modest at best.  
Other forces, including the growing costs of judicial election campaigns and 
the increasing involvement of interest groups in judicial elections,23 are 
 
23 See generally DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2002:  HOW THE THREAT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS SPREAD TO 
MORE STATES IN 2002 (2004) (arguing that special interest groups pressure state supreme 
court candidates to sacrifice impartiality once elected), available at 
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likely to swamp the effects of continued enforcement of the canons.  As I 
will discuss in the Conclusion, the quality of judicial elections and the im-
partiality of judicial decision making might be better advanced through 
other devices, particularly public funding of judicial elections and the exclu-
sion of judges from cases where their campaign statements indicate they 
have prejudged the outcome. 
I.  ALL ELECTIONS ARE NOT ALIKE:  THE VARIATION IN ELECTION RULES 
ACCORDING TO THE PURPOSE OF THE ELECTION 
One strand in the debate over judicial campaign rules essentially relies 
on the argument that, although there is no requirement that judges be 
elected, when a state “opt[s] for an elected judiciary,”24 the state thereby 
also agrees to submit to a package of constitutional constraints that apply to 
all elections.  But there is a surprising degree of variability in the constitu-
tional rules that govern elections.  On more than one occasion, the Supreme 
Court has distinguished among elections for different types of public of-
fices, between elections for office and elections concerning ballot proposi-
tions, and even among different types of ballot issues.  These distinctions 
affect who may vote, how votes may be weighted, and how campaign fi-
nances may be regulated.  As a result, the standard constitutional require-
ments of universal suffrage and equally weighted votes do not apply to all 
elections.  Similarly, the constitutionality of campaign contribution restric-
tions turns on the nature of the election.  Rather than requiring a uniform set 
of election rules, the Court has held that requirements may vary in light of 
the government actions affected by the election, the differential impact of 
the election on different constituencies, and the differences in the dangers 
posed by the regulated behavior on the public offices or issues determined 
by the election. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has exempted certain elections from the re-
quirements of universal suffrage and one person, one vote.  In the special 
district cases involving referenda in or the election of members to the boards 
of directors of highly specialized government bodies engaged in irrigation, 
water storage, and flood control, the Court held that due to the special lim-
ited purposes of the districts and the disproportionate impact of the districts’ 
activities on a discrete constituency—landowners—the franchise could be 
limited to landowners, and, indeed, votes could be allocated according to 
 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/justiceatstake_2004
0506/b_new_politics_report.pdf (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
24 White, 536 U.S. at 795 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
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assessed valuation.25  The Court determined that the districts engaged in a 
very limited range of activities and did not exercise core governmental 
powers like taxation, lawmaking, or the provision of basic public services.26  
Moreover, the Court found that landowners bore financial responsibility for 
the districts’ expenses and bond obligations, and were the primary focus of 
the districts’ activities.  Indeed, the states had established these districts for 
the benefit of the landowners.  As a result, the Court concluded that the dis-
tricts were not subject to the rules of universal suffrage and equally 
weighted voting applicable to most federal, state, and local elections.  The 
Court held that states could limit the electoral constituency and allocate vot-
ing power in accordance with the special purposes of the districts.  The 
lower federal courts have extended the special district exception to districts 
whose focuses include the core functions of government not found in the 
special district cases—including education, street maintenance, and sanita-
tion—when the districts in question have limited powers, may be character-
ized as advisory or supplemental, and do not wield significant governing au-
thority.27 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that certain bond issue elections 
need not be subject to the rule of equal voting power.  In Gordon v. Lance,28 
the Court upheld a West Virginia constitutional provision that conditioned 
the approval of state and local bond issues on the affirmative votes of 60% 
of the voters in a referendum.29  Such a rule permits a minority of voters to 
block a majority-approved bond issue and, thus, gives those minority voters 
voting power disproportionate to their numbers.30  The Supreme Court, 
however, found that, due in part to the nature of the issue, the state could 
condition approval of the bond issue on an electoral supermajority:  “It must 
 
25 See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (“[T]he State could rationally limit 
the vote to landowners.”); Associated Enters. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 
U.S. 743, 745 (1973) (holding that since landowners are the ones primarily burdened and 
benefited by the watershed development, votes on the project can be allocated accordingly); 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730-31 (1973) (rul-
ing that non-landowning residents may be excluded from the franchise regarding the water-
shed district). 
26 Ball, 451 U.S. at 366. 
27 See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 93-94 (2d Cir. 
1998) (affirming finding that a business improvement district is a special, limited-purpose en-
tity that is not subject to the requirement of one person, one vote); Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of 
Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that Chicago school councils are special-
purpose governmental bodies that do not need to adhere to the one person, one vote principle). 
28 403 U.S. 1 (1971). 
29 Id. at 7-8. 
30 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals so found and invalidated the state con-
stitutional provision.  Lance v. Bd. of Educ., 170 S.E.2d 783, 791 (W. Va. 1969). 
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be remembered that in voting to issue bonds voters are committing, in part, 
the credit of infants and of generations yet unborn, and some restriction on 
such commitment is not an unreasonable demand.”31 
To be sure, Gordon relied on a second consideration:  that West Vir-
ginia’s supermajority requirement did not privilege or burden any specific 
group or issue.  Any minority greater than 40% of the vote could block any 
majority less than 60% on any bond issue.32  But the importance of that con-
sideration may have been reduced—and the significance of the purpose of 
the election increased—a few years later by Town of Lockport v. Citizens 
for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc.33  In this case, the Court up-
held a provision of the New York Constitution that conditioned the reor-
ganization of county government on approval, in a referendum, of concur-
rent majorities of city and non-city voters within a county.  As a result, a 
narrow majority of non-city voters in Niagara County was able to block a 
county government reorganization favored by both the city voters and an 
aggregate majority of all of Niagara’s voters.34  Unlike the voting rule in 
Gordon, the New York requirement did provide special recognition to a dis-
tinct constituency within the county, and the concurrent majority require-
ment was limited to a particular issue.  The Supreme Court, however, found 
that this was constitutional because of the nature of the question put to the 
voters.  The referendum was a “single-shot” vote which would transform 
county government, change the powers of county subunits, and alter the re-
lationships between subunits and the county.35  Such a change could have 
different consequences for the urban and nonurban parts of the county.  
Looking to the special-district cases, the Court found that “the different 
county constituent units” would be “directly and differentially affected by 
the restructuring of county government”36 and, thus, the state could require 
the separate consent of each of the affected groups—even though, under 
Avery v. Midland County,37 it would have been unconstitutional to give non-
city voters a comparably disproportionate power in the ongoing governance 
of the county. 
The constitutionality of campaign finance practices as well as voting 
rules may vary according to the nature of the election.  Although the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly upheld limitations on the dollar amounts that 
 
31 Gordon, 403 U.S. at 6. 
32 Id. at 4-5. 
33 430 U.S. 259 (1977). 
34 Id. at 262. 
35 Id. at 266. 
36 Id. at 272. 
37 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
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may be contributed to candidates, political parties, and political committees 
in connection with elections for office, the Court has held that it is unconsti-
tutional to limit the amount of money that may be contributed to a political 
committee that supports or opposes a ballot proposition.38  Contributions to 
candidates, and to parties and committees that contribute to or otherwise 
support candidates for office, raise the dangers of the corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption of officeholders.  Due to their dependence on dona-
tions for their campaigns, officeholders may be “too compliant with the 
wishes of large contributors.”39  Moreover, even the appearance of improper 
influence resulting from large contributions to candidates for elective office 
could undermine confidence in the system of representative government to a 
disastrous extent.40  But “‘[r]eferenda are held on issues, not candidates for 
public office.  The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate 
elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.’”41  As a 
result, the prevention of corruption could not justify limiting contributions 
to committees that spend money in ballot proposition elections.  Due to the 
differences in the nature of candidate and ballot proposition elections and in 
the implications of campaign finance practices for government, the First 
Amendment permits the limitation of contributions in candidate elections 
but not in ballot proposition elections.42 
Of course, the notion that different constitutional rules apply to differ-
ent types of elections is hardly news in the context of judicial elections.  
Three decades ago in Wells v. Edwards the Supreme Court upheld without 
opinion a lower court finding that judicial elections are not subject to one 
person, one vote.43  The lower court predicated its decision on what it saw 
as the distinctive nature of the judicial office, determining that judges “‘are 
not representatives in the same sense as are legislators . . . .’ Thus, the ra-
tionale behind the one-man, one-vote principle, which evolved out of efforts 
to preserve a truly representative form of government, is simply not relevant 
 
38 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 
U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981). 
39 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
40 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). 
41 Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (citations omitted)). 
42 The Court has drawn a similar distinction with respect to the regulation of campaign 
expenditures by corporations—corporate spending in ballot proposition elections is constitu-
tionally protected.  First Nat’l Bank, 435 U.S. at 795.  But the expenditure of corporate treas-
ury funds to promote or oppose the election of a candidate may be barred.  McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 666-68 (2003); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 
494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990). 
43 Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973), aff’g 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972). 
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to the makeup of the judiciary.”44  To be sure, Wells has arguably been un-
dermined by the Court’s subsequent decision in Chisom v. Roemer,45 which 
held that the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections.  Chisom inter-
preted the provision of section 2 of the Act, which refers to the opportunity 
of citizens protected by the Act “to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice,”46 to include the election of judges.  
But Chisom based its decision on the intent of Congress, denied that the 
case presented a constitutional claim, and distinguished and thereby pre-
served Wells47—even though Chisom’s recognition that courts “engage in 
policymaking at some level”48 and that the concept of representativeness is 
implicated by a state’s decision to select its judges by popular election49 is 
plainly in tension with the reasoning that animated Wells. 
In short, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the constitu-
tional norms governing elections—such as the scope of suffrage, the alloca-
tion of voting power, and the power to restrict campaign finance practices—
may vary according to the subject of the election, including the nature of the 
issue put before the voters or the powers and responsibilities of the office to 
be filled.  This has affected both judicial elections and, as the campaign con-
tribution cases indicate, the rules governing the conduct of election cam-
paigns.  Requiring that a judicial office be filled by election does not auto-
matically trigger a uniform set of constitutional restrictions and 
requirements dealing with elections, because no such uniform set exists. 
Of course, saying that the constitutional rules that govern elections may 
vary in light of the issue resolved or the office filled by the election merely 
opens the door to the consideration of the constitutionality of judicial cam-
paign conduct codes; it does not assume that the more restrictive rules are 
constitutional.  Much turns on the nature of the judicial function and how it 
differs from legislative and executive offices, as well as on how well the re-
strictive rules reflect those differences.  As the tension between the holdings 
 
44 Wells, 347 F. Supp. at 455 (quoting Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. 
Ga. 1964) (per curiam)). 
45 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991); see also Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney Gen., 501 
U.S. 419, 421 (1991) (upholding application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to elections 
for trial judges); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991) (reviewing application of section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act to judicial elections). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
47 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 402-03. 
48 Id. at 399 n.27. 
49 See id. at 401 (“When each of several members of a court must be a resident of a sepa-
rate district, and must be elected by the voters of that district, it seems both reasonable and 
realistic to characterize the winners as representatives of that district.”). 
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in Wells and Chisom indicate, the nature of the judicial function,50 the extent 
to which elected judges ought to be considered representatives of the voters 
who elect them, and the very meaning of representation in the judicial con-
text perplexed and divided the Court in both the equal protection and voting 
rights settings.51  It is not surprising that the application of the First 
Amendment to these codes is difficult as well. 
II.  THE REGULATION OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
A.  General Considerations 
Any restriction on the speech or conduct of election campaign partici-
pants implicates at least three interrelated values:  (i) the expressive and par-
ticipatory rights of candidates, their supporters, and other campaign partici-
pants; (ii) the interests of voters in obtaining sufficient information to enable 
them to make an intelligent choice on election day; and (iii) the systemic in-
terest in competitive elections. 
Elections are our central form of collective political decision making 
and, thus, they are our most important mechanism for securing democrati-
cally accountable government.  The very legitimacy of our system of elec-
tions requires that candidates be able to participate in the electoral process 
and to make their cases to the voters.  A free election assumes that candi-
dates are free not simply to place their names on the ballot but to contest the 
election vigorously.  A vigorous contest includes the freedom to communi-
cate with the voters to attempt to persuade them to cast their ballots for a 
particular candidate. 
 
50 This question has come up not just in the context of judicial elections but also with 
respect to appointed judges.  In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the Court found 
that appointed state judges fell within the statutory exemption from the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act for “appointees ‘on the policymaking level,’” noting then-Governor 
Ashcroft’s contention that, in Missouri, judges exercise policymaking responsibilities, declin-
ing to find that judges are “policymakers in the same sense as the executive or legislature,” 
but concluding that it was sufficient for the statutory exemption that an appointed judge “is in 
a position requiring the exercise of discretion concerning issues of public importance.”  Id. at 
466-67. 
51 Both Wells and Chisom were 6-3 decisions.  Justices White and Marshall, who dis-
sented in Wells, were in the majority in Chisom.  Then-Justice Rehnquist, who was in the ma-
jority in Wells, dissented in Chisom.  The only member of the Court in the majority in both 
cases was Justice Blackmun.  Strikingly, in light of his role as author of the majority opinion 
in White, Justice Scalia also authored the dissent in Chisom, observing that “representative” 
means not just one who is “elected by the people, but who also, at a minimum, acts on behalf 
of the people.  Judges do that in a sense—but not in the ordinary sense. . . . [W]e do not ordi-
narily conceive of judges as representatives [in that sense].”  Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410-11 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The legitimacy of the election also turns on the ability of voters to re-
ceive the information they need in order to cast informed votes.  This is not 
simply a matter of enabling each voter to make a choice consistent with her 
interests or beliefs.  Citizens as voters are making choices that bind the pol-
ity as a whole and set the course of official decision making for the term of 
the elected official.  There is, thus, a collective interest in increasing the 
amount of relevant information available to the voters in the hope of im-
proving the quality of voter decision making. 
Elections may also be seen as a key way for voters to check the gov-
ernment and to make it accountable to them.  The opportunity to deny re-
election to incumbents, and the possibility that in any given election the 
people may exercise their authority to vote out current officeholders, is per-
haps the ultimate security of popular control over  government.  This re-
quires competitive elections.  Challengers must be able to get on the ballot 
and make their case to the voters not just as a matter of the challengers’ 
rights but to vindicate the systemic interest in using competitive elections to 
hold elected officials accountable. 
Political participation, voter information, and electoral competitiveness 
may all be burdened by restraints on campaign speech and conduct.  Yet, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that candidates and other campaign 
participants may be subject to some form of regulation: 
Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that gov-
ernment must play an active role in structuring elections; “as a practical matter, 
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and 
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democ-
ratic processes.”52 
Some of these regulations are designed to improve the quality of the 
electoral process.  Contribution disclosure requirements, for example, have 
been upheld, even though they may chill the activities of certain donors who 
would prefer anonymity and thus indirectly hurt the campaigns of those 
candidates the putative donors would have supported.  Nevertheless, disclo-
sure has been held to confer important benefits on the electoral process be-
cause it provides the voters with useful information concerning the sources 
of a candidate’s financial support and thus “allows voters to place each can-
didate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely 
on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.”53  Similarly, some re-
strictions on the ability of candidates to place their names on the ballot have 
 
52 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 
730 (1974)). 
53 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam). 
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been justified as preventing “ballot overcrowding” and “voter confusion.”54  
So, too, restrictions on electioneering near polling places “serve the States’ 
compelling interests in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud.”55 
More commonly, election restrictions are justified in terms of their im-
pact on government.  Restrictions on minor parties, write-in voters, and 
sore-loser candidates, who bolt their parties after losing a primary and then 
run as independents, have been upheld as reducing factionalism and promot-
ing the two-party system, with the asserted benefits of facilitating majority 
rule and protecting government stability.56  So, too, restrictions on campaign 
contributions have been upheld, notwithstanding their impact on political 
expression and association, because such limits alleviate the corruption dan-
ger of officeholders “too compliant with the wishes of large contributors”57 
and address the appearance of corruption that can demoralize the public and 
undermine belief in government integrity.  In short, the values of free 
speech, voter information, and unfettered competitiveness may have to give 
way when electioneering practices threaten to undermine other public val-
ues. 
B.  Regulating Judicial Elections 
The special restrictions on judicial candidates plainly limit their ability 
to participate in their own campaigns and to persuade voters to vote for 
them.  By restricting pledges, promises, and other statements with respect to 
disputed political and legal issues, the canons deny candidates the opportu-
nity to speak about some of the questions that may be most salient to their 
candidacies.  The ban on misstatements may further cause candidates to be 
cautious about what they say.  The ban on personal solicitation may limit 
the ability of candidates to raise the money necessary to fund their cam-
paigns.  The restrictions on other political activity may curtail a judicial 
candidate’s ability to associate with her political party and build the party’s 
support for her candidacy. 
These restrictions concomitantly threaten the systemic interest in com-
petitive elections.  If candidates cannot speak freely about contested legal 
issues, work with their parties, and raise money personally, their ability to 
campaign effectively may be undermined.  This is particularly true in judi-
 
54 Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986). 
55 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992). 
56 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 379-80 (1997) (up-
holding constitutionality of a Minnesota election regulation that had the effect of favoring a 
two-party system). 
57 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
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cial elections, which have traditionally been low-salience events, with low 
public interest, very low free media coverage, and, as a result, low voter turn-
out.58  These restrictions may make it more difficult to get the public inter-
ested in judicial campaigns.  This burden weighs particularly heavily on 
challengers, who are likely to lack even the limited name recognition that 
the incumbents enjoy.  The less the candidates can say or do, the less com-
petitive the elections are likely to be. 
Candidate speech restrictions also, by definition, limit voter informa-
tion.  With the free media providing limited or no coverage to judicial elec-
tions, voters obtain virtually all their information about judicial candidates 
from the candidates themselves or from other electoral actors, such as spe-
cial interest organizations that undertake independent expenditure efforts.  
The canons, however, would limit candidates to discussing their resumes and 
personalities and the resumes and personalities of their opponents, and 
would bar them from discussing the kinds of legal issues that could come 
before their courts.  This surely limits the information available to the voters 
concerning how the candidates might address the cases that they are called 
upon to adjudicate.  Moreover, not only would the voters have less informa-
tion, but any information they do obtain concerning candidate views of legal 
issues would likely come from interest groups—which are not subject to the 
judicial canons—rather than the candidates themselves. 
To be sure, some proponents of the judicial canons appear to have their 
doubts about both the value of competitive elections and the benefits of in-
forming voters about candidate views concerning legal issues.  Many appear 
to treat competitive elections as a threat to the independence of the judici-
ary, as judges facing an upcoming reelection may finding themselves tailor-
ing their decisions in light of the electorate’s anticipated reaction.59  So, too, 
defenders of the canons appear to assume that candidate views about legal 
issues are not actually relevant to the questions of which of two competing 
candidates should be elected or whether an incumbent judge should be re-
tained.  For some defenders of the canons, educational and professional at-
tainments, experience, character, and temperament, rather than views, are the 
only information that voters should need to make their decisions. 
 
58 See Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000:  Change and Challenge, 
2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 855 (2001) (“Polls over many years show a startling voter 
unawareness of even the names of even the most visible judicial candidates.  Judicial races almost 
never draw press coverage . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, A Commentary on Public Funds or Publicly Funded 
Benefits and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. REV. 845, 848 (2001) (arguing 
that judges “are not supposed to be ‘accountable’ for their decisions to public opinion”). 
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The concern about competition seems antithetical to the very idea of 
having elections.  Indeed, it is inconsistent with anything other than life ten-
ure for judges, since even appointed judges who serve for terms have to se-
cure the approval of political decision makers if they want to continue in of-
fice after the conclusion of their terms.  The challenge to independence, 
then, comes not so much from the election but from the limited term.60  The 
real issue is what considerations ought to go into the thinking of the ap-
pointing officials—or the voters—in deciding whether to select or retain a 
judge, which leads directly to the second question of what information 
ought those decision makers to have. 
This requires some consideration of the nature of judging.  If judging were 
simply a matter of the mechanical application of precise rules to canned 
facts, then there would be a lot to be said for limiting judicial election cam-
paigns to a comparison of educational attainments, professional qualifica-
tions, and other evidence of the candidates’ technical skills, and for exclud-
ing as extraneous the candidates’ views on legal and political issues.  But 
this description misses much of the nature of the judicial function and of the 
laws that judges interpret and apply.  Judges find disputed facts, apply 
loosely defined legal rules, and shape the development of legal doctrine.61  
Their decisions are inescapably affected by their own views and beliefs 
about law and public policy.  Information about those views is, thus, deeply 
relevant to the decisions of the appointing, and reappointing, authority, 
whether a governor or the voters.  As the Michigan Supreme Court recently 
observed, a judicial election provides the opportunity for “meaningful de-
bate . . . concerning the overall direction of the courts and the role of indi-
vidual judges in contributing to that direction.”62  That meaningful debate 
cannot take place unless judges and judicial candidates are free to partici-
pate in it. 
With the interests in electoral competition and voter information as 
strong in the judicial setting as in the executive and legislative arenas, the 
issue in considering the constitutionality of judicial campaign codes is 
 
60 Cf. Richard L. Hasen, “High Court Wrongly Elected”:  A Public Choice Model of 
Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1330-35 (1997) 
(arguing that length of judicial term is the primary determinant of degree of judicial independ-
ence). 
61 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 535, 542-43 (1999) (demonstrating that where there is not a clear legal rule or judges 
have discretion to pronounce general legal rules, judges’ viewpoints affect their decisions); W. 
Bradley Wendel, The Ideology of Judging and the First Amendment in Judicial Election Cam-
paigns, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 109 (2001) (“Applicable legal principles may be plural and 
conflicting.”). 
62 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 42 (Mich. 2000). 
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whether there are aspects of the judicial office that support greater regula-
tion of judicial elections than elections for the legislative and executive 
branches.  Defenders of the canons point to three interrelated concerns:  ju-
dicial impartiality, judicial independence, and a more amorphous sense that 
judges must be set “aside from the hurly-burly of sometimes unseemly po-
litical strife.”63 
Judicial impartiality refers to the constitutional imperative that judges 
treat all parties before them fairly and equally and decide cases according to 
the evidence and the law.  Like the statue of blindfolded Justice who pre-
sides over so many courthouses, judges are supposed to do their work while 
remaining indifferent to the identities of the parties and lawyers before 
them, without a preference for one side or a bias against the other.  As Chief 
Justice Randall T. Shepard of Indiana has argued, the duty of judicial impar-
tiality and the rules protecting it “have their foundations in due process.”64 
The duty of impartiality distinguishes judges from executives and legis-
lators.  Executive and legislative officeholders are free to favor one set of 
interests over another, to make decisions after hearing just one side of the 
argument, and to dig in their heels in support of one position.  And certainly 
executive and legislative candidates are free to emphasize their biases, 
prejudices, and commitments in their campaigns.  As one circuit court has 
noted, campaign promises “are desirable so that voters may make a choice 
between proposed agendas that affect the public.”65  Similar campaign 
statements by judicial candidates, however, can threaten judicial impartiality 
if they indicate that the candidate has predetermined how she will act on the 
bench and suggest that the judge will not treat all cases and parties even-
handedly.  So, too, judicial candidates can make statements that undermine 
the appearance of judicial impartiality and, thus, the public’s confidence in 
the fairness of the courts. 
Judicial independence is linked to impartiality since only a judge inde-
pendent of outside pressures can impartially apply the law to all the parties 
who appear before her.  But independence also implicates the separation of 
powers and the freedom of the courts from the other branches of govern-
ment.  To be sure, separation-of-powers concerns apply to the executive and 
the legislature as well, and constitutional law has been used to upset even 
consensual agreements between those branches.  But independence has been 
 
63 Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech:  Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1067 (1996); accord Robert F. Bauer, Thoughts on the Democ-
ratic Basis for Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 35 IND. L. REV. 747, 749-51 (2001) 
(discussing the “judge-politician divide”). 
64 Shepard, supra note 63, at 1060. 
65 Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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treated as particularly important for the courts, as it enables judges to pursue 
their special role in protecting the constitutional rights of minorities and 
vindicating the rule of law even for unpopular parties.66  The executive and 
legislative branches have to work together in order for government to func-
tion as a whole.  But the independence of the courts from the assertedly 
more political branches is essential if the courts are to apply the rule of law 
and protect minorities.  As a result, although we celebrate the role of politi-
cal parties in linking up the separate houses of a bicameral legislature, the 
legislature with the executive, and the different levels of our federal system 
to facilitate more effective governance, if the parties were comparably ef-
fective in coordinating the actions of the courts with the other branches, the 
capacity of the courts to carry out their duties could be seriously under-
mined. 
The third argument for the canons looks not so much to the operational 
separation of the judicial from the political as to the asserted distinctiveness 
of judicial and political behavior.  It reflects the view that in order for 
judges to take their role seriously and apply the law impartially, protect 
rights, and defend minorities, they need to enjoy a special degree of public 
respect—a respect that would be impaired if judges campaigned like ordi-
nary politicians.  As one jurist has observed, “[w]e place courts and judges 
on a higher plateau.”67  This requires that judicial candidates abide by 
higher standards of civility and decorum, as judicial-candidate “mudsling-
ing” poses a “threat to judicial integrity and public confidence in the judici-
ary.”68 
This “higher plateau” argument for the special nature of the judiciary is 
perhaps the weakest of the three, as even some defenders of the canons have 
acknowledged.69  It may be hard to see why judges are more demeaned by 
 
66 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Elective Judiciaries and the Rule 
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726-29 (1995) (warning that an elective judiciary may com-
promise the rights of unpopular minorities). 
67 Shepard, supra note 63, at 1067. 
68 Adam R. Long, Keeping Mud Off the Bench:  The First Amendment and Regulation of 
Candidates’ False or Misleading Statements in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J. 787, 803 
(2001); see also Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (ruling that 
restrictions on judicial candidate misrepresentations are necessary “so as not to damage the 
actual and perceived integrity” of the judiciary), aff’d mem., 861 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988); cf. 
ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (“[A] state may re-
quire [judicial] candidates to maintain a higher standard of conduct than can be expected of 
candidates in other types of elective contests.”). 
69 See, e.g., Robert M. O’Neil, The Canons in the Courts:  Recent First Amendment Rul-
ings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701, 715 (2002) (referring to “occasional slighting references to a nos-
talgic desire for ‘civility in judicial campaigns’” while contending that the major case for the 
canons is protection of judicial impartiality (quoting In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 40, 43 
(Mich. 2000))). 
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the “hurly-burly” of campaigning than are gubernatorial or legislative can-
didates.  So, too, the provision for judicial elections means that state judges, 
like other elected officials, can command respect and legitimacy from their 
popular mandate and do not need to present themselves as above politics.  
Moreover, governors and legislators, no less than judges, must on occasion 
make unpopular decisions and try to lead rather than follow public opinion 
if they are to pursue the long-term public interest.  Still, there may be some-
thing to the argument that elected judges need the greater respectability that 
might come from higher-toned campaigns in order to bring off the delicate 
balancing act of reconciling their public accountability with their constitu-
tional obligation to the rule of law. 
Ultimately, the argument for the constitutionality of the special regula-
tion of judicial elections requires the determination that judging, although 
informed by the legal and political viewpoints of the judges, requires special 
protection from the political consequences of election campaigns.  To some 
extent, the question recapitulates the ongoing and increasingly intense de-
bate over the factors that ought to go into the appointment and confirmation 
of life-tenured federal judges.  Surely, a candidate’s judicial philosophy, 
views of past cases and current legal controversies, and political beliefs are 
relevant to how she will exercise the discretion intrinsic to judging.  Yet, we 
still want judges, as they decide individual cases, to consider only the evi-
dence and the law before them, to give a fair hearing to all the parties, and 
to make decisions independent of precommitments and external pressures.  
Judging is political, but it still must be undertaken apart from politics.  The 
judicial campaign canons, and the debate over the constitutionality of the 
canons, must walk the very elusive and possibly illusory line of permitting 
judicial candidates to engage vigorously in the political and legal debates 
relevant to their role while barring them from undermining the impartiality 
and independence the courts should display, and the respect judges should 
receive, if the judicial system is to provide evenhanded justice, protect con-
stitutional rights, and enjoy public confidence. 
In a sense, the battle over the constitutionality of the canons resembles 
the conflict over the constitutionality of campaign finance reform.  In both 
situations, regulations would restrict the ability of campaign participants to 
make their views known to the electorate, thereby limiting both the cam-
paigners’ rights and the information the public needs in order to cast an in-
telligent vote.  In both situations, the regulations are vindicated in terms of 
the impact of unrestricted campaign practices on the interelection perform-
ance of government.  Much as judicial campaign conduct restrictions are 
justified primarily in terms of judicial impartiality and independence, con-
tribution restrictions have been justified as preventing corruption and the 
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appearance of corruption.70  Indeed, judicial partiality and the loss of judi-
cial independence may be said to constitute corruption of the judicial func-
tion. 
As in the campaign finance setting, the meaning of judicial impartiality, 
like the meaning of corruption, has proven to be difficult to determine.  The 
Supreme Court has defined corruption as the situation that results when 
elected officials are “too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”71  
Yet, surely the willingness of elected officials to respond to the requests of 
their supporters is often appropriate and may indeed be politically desirable.  
As Justice Kennedy, dissenting in part in the recent McConnell decision, 
observed, “democracy is premised on responsiveness.”72  Basing the consti-
tutionality of campaign finance regulation on the prevention of corruption 
requires a theory that can “distinguish good political responsiveness from 
bad.”73  In McConnell, the Supreme Court found that the “special access”74 
or “preferential access”75 that large donors obtain in exchange for their con-
tributions is the distinctive “bad responsiveness”76 that can justify campaign 
finance regulation.  Indeed, the Court was surprisingly deferential to Con-
gress’s findings concerning the kind of campaign finance practices that raise 
the danger of special access for donors.77 
It remains to be seen if, after White, there is a theory, and concomitant 
campaign speech and conduct restrictions, that can “distinguish good politi-
cal responsiveness from bad”78 in the judicial setting, too.  But the campaign 
finance cases in general and McConnell in particular provide strong support 
for the constitutionality of restrictions on judicial campaign practices that 
can be seen as threatening to corrupt the judicial function or as creating the 
appearance that the judicial function has been corrupted. 
 
70 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that anticorruption 
concerns justify restrictions on the size of campaign contributions). 
71 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). 
72 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 748 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 686. 
75 Id. at 668. 
76 Id. at 748. (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
77 See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Fi-
nance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 165-67 (2004) (explaining that the Court relied primarily on 
general assertions about the pervasive effects of contributions on the political process rather 
than on evidence of the impact of particular donations on specific government actions). 
78 McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 748 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part). 
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III.  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CANONS AFTER REPUBLICAN  
PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE  
A.  White and the Announce Clause 
White considered and invalidated the Minnesota Code of Judicial Con-
duct’s Announce Clause, which stated that a judicial candidate should not 
“announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”79  Promul-
gated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1974, the Announce Clause was 
based squarely on Canon 7B of the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) in 1972.  The ABA has profoundly 
shaped the development and content of state judicial campaign regulation.  
The ABA first sought to address judicial campaign behavior in 1924 when it 
adopted its Canons of Judicial Ethics.  Canon 30 provided, inter alia, that a 
judicial candidate “should not announce in advance his conclusions of law 
on disputed issues to secure class support.” 80  Although “[f]orty-three states 
adopted some version of the 1924 Canons,”81 the 1924 Canons were horta-
tory and “not intended to be a basis for disciplinary action.”82  In 1972 the 
ABA promulgated the Code of Judicial Conduct, which included the lan-
guage subsequently adopted by Minnesota.83  With minor variations, the 
1972 Code was adopted by some forty-seven states.84 
Even prior to the White decision, the Announce Clause was on shaky 
constitutional ground.  When the ABA revised the Model Code in 1990, it 
dropped the Announce Clause.  The Note accompanying the legislative draft 
explained that the ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility believed the Announce Clause was “an overly broad restriction on 
speech.”85  The Announce Clause was replaced by language prohibiting a 
candidate from making “statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to 
come before the court.”86  The ABA’s concern about the overly broad na-
ture of the Announce Clause was echoed in a series of court decisions dur-
 
79 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002) (quoting MINN. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
80 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924). 
81 Katherine A. Moerke, Must More Speech Be the Solution to Harmful Speech?  Judi-
cial Elections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48 S.D. L. REV. 262, 266 (2003). 
82 Rick A. Johnson, Judicial Campaign Speech in Kentucky After Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 347, 353 (2003). 
83 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). 
84 Moerke, supra note 81, at 267. 
85 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AS SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE 
1990 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE ABA app. C, at 72 (1990). 
86 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
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ing the early 1990s narrowing or invalidating the Announce Clause in states 
that had not modified their canons.87  By the time of White, due to constitu-
tional challenges and canon revisions, only nine state canons continued to 
retain the Announce Clause, and several of these were narrower, by their 
terms or as a result of judicial interpretation, than the Clause at issue in 
White.88 
As the Court noted, one of the primary arguments asserted in defense of 
the Announce Clause was that it “preserv[ed] the impartiality of the state 
judiciary.”89  Justice Scalia’s opinion parsed the concept of impartiality, 
finding that it could be used in any of three possible senses:  (i) the avoid-
ance of bias for or against a specific party in a judicial proceeding; (ii) the 
“lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view”; or (iii) 
open-mindedness, in the sense of being “open to persuasion.”90 
The Court appeared to accept the compelling nature of the first sense of 
impartiality—avoiding bias against a party—but concluded that the An-
nounce Clause did little to advance that interest since the Clause referred 
only to statements about legal issues, not parties.91  Moreover, the An-
nounce Clause was far broader than an anti-party-bias rule, and hence not 
narrowly tailored to serve the interest in preventing bias against parties.92 
The Court sharply rejected the second definition of impartiality.  Al-
though at one point the Court suggested there is a public interest in prevent-
 
87 See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1993) (find-
ing Illinois’ Announce Clause unconstitutionally overbroad); Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 
913, 918 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (finding Arkansas Announce Clause unconstitutionally overbroad); 
ACLU of Fla. v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (concluding that plain-
tiffs are likely to succeed in their constitutional challenge to Florida’s Announce Clause); 
J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991) (finding Kentucky’s Announce Clause 
unconstitutionally overbroad); cf. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 
1991) (subjecting Pennsylvania’s Announce Clause to narrowing interpretation and upholding 
it as narrowed).  Stretton narrowed the Announce Clause by holding that it applied only to 
issues “likely” to come before the court.  The Seventh Circuit, in Buckley, treated that as an 
illusory limitation, reasoning that almost any issue could come before a court.  997 F.2d at 
229-30; see also Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (interpreting 
Ohio’s Announce Clause as not applying to the announcement of views concerning questions 
of judicial administration), aff’d mem., 861 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988). 
88 Moerke, supra note 81, at 267-68 & n.54. 
89 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).  The Court noted that 
the Eighth Circuit had also referred to a compelling government interest in an independent 
judiciary but found that both the lower court and respondents had used the concepts of impar-
tiality and independence interchangeably.  Id. at 775 n.6.  As a result, the Court did not sepa-
rately consider whether the interest in judicial independence was compelling or whether the 
Announce Clause was narrowly tailored to promote that interest. 
90 Id. at 775-78. 
91 Id. at 776. 
92 Id. 
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ing judicial preconceptions but that such interest is not constitutionally 
compelling,93 the thrust of Justice Scalia’s opinion was to deny any value to 
this version of impartiality at all.  In the Court’s view, not only do most 
judges come to the bench with at least some preconceptions about the law, 
so that the goal of the Announce Clause is impossible to attain, but avoiding 
judicial preconceptions would not even be desirable.  As Justice Scalia ob-
served, quoting an earlier statement of then-Justice Rehnquist, “[p]roof that 
a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa 
in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of quali-
fication, not lack of bias.”94 
The Court then turned to impartiality-as-open-mindedness: 
This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on legal 
issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, 
and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case.  This 
sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win 
the legal points in the case, but at least some chance of doing so.95 
But the Court declined to determine whether impartiality-as-open-
mindedness is a compelling state interest, “since we do not believe the Min-
nesota Supreme Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose.”96  
Moreover, the Court concluded that by regulating only statements in elec-
tion campaigns the Announce Clause was fatally under-inclusive.  Even if, 
as respondents contended, campaign statements about disputed legal and po-
litical issues could create undue pressure for judges to adhere to certain po-
sitions in subsequent cases, “statements in election campaigns are such an 
infinitesimal portion of the public commitments to legal positions that 
judges (or judges-to-be) undertake” that it was “implausible” to believe that 
an Announce Clause aimed solely at campaign statements could alleviate 
those pressures.97  Judges and candidates could have aired their views in 
published opinions, books, speeches, or in the course of other political ac-
tivities before they went on the bench.98  “As a means of pursuing the objec-
tive of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce 
clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a 
challenge to the credulous.”99 
 
93 Id. at 777. 
94 Id. at 778 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.)). 
95 Id. at 778. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 779. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 780. 
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The Court was right to invalidate the Announce Clause.  As even the 
ABA had previously recognized, the Clause cut deeply into judicial election 
speech, denying voters a wide range of information relevant to their elec-
toral decisions.  The Clause burdened challengers, who, in low-salience ju-
dicial elections, have a special need to get their views on disputed legal and 
political issues to the voters so that there can be some voter interest in the 
election and some basis for evaluating the differences between a challenger 
and the incumbent.  Yet, the Clause could also be unfair to an incumbent, 
who, if attacked for an unpopular ruling, might be barred by the Clause 
from defending the legal reasoning that required the decision.  Most impor-
tantly, the Announce Clause has the paradoxical effect of taking the discus-
sion of significant election-related issues away from the candidates and 
handing it over to the high-spending interest groups who have been so criti-
cized for politicizing, if not debasing, judicial election campaigns.100  After 
all, the canons regulate only incumbent judges and candidates for judicial 
office; they do not and cannot regulate the television advertising of the 
business groups, labor unions, trial lawyers, and other interest groups who 
loom so large in contemporary judicial elections.  Under the Announce 
Clause, political and legal issues would surely be discussed during judicial 
election campaigns, but the candidates—and only the candidates—would be 
muzzled.101 
With respect to the role of the Announce Clause in protecting judicial 
impartiality, the Court was correct in its conclusion that the Clause was 
poorly aimed at the prevention of bias against parties and, more importantly, 
that impartiality cannot be equated with an absence of preconceptions about 
legal issues.  Surely, any candidate with significant experience in law has 
some preconceptions about legal issues.  All the Announce Clause could do 
was preclude candidates from telling the electorate about their preconcep-
tions.  And if the articulation of views concerning legal issues is treated as 
an absence of impartiality, many veteran judges with consistent jurispruden-
tial approaches in certain types of cases would be barred from hearing those 
cases in the future. 
The Court’s treatment of the argument of impartiality-as-open-
mindedness, however, had two troubling features that raise questions for 
some of the other canons dealing with judicial campaign activity.  First, the 
 
100 On the large and growing role of interest groups in judicial elections, see generally 
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1391 
(2001) (discussing the increasingly sophisticated techniques used by interest groups to influ-
ence judicial politics). 
101 But cf. GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 23-25 (contending that White em-
boldened interest groups to press candidates for statements of their positions on issues). 
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Court declined to find—or to reject—that the preservation of impartiality-
as-open-mindedness is a compelling state interest.  The Court declined to 
“pursue that inquiry” since it concluded that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had not adopted the Announce Clause for that purpose.102  It is not clear 
why the purpose of the Minnesota Supreme Court, as opposed to the text 
and effect of the Clause, was crucial.  Plainly the Court considered the 
Clause to be too loosely tailored to be justified by the interest in protecting 
open-mindedness.  Indeed, it is far from clear why a statement by a judge-
as-candidate about her general views on a legal issue would be subsequently 
treated by the candidate-as-judge as a precommitment.  Yet, the protection 
of impartiality-as-open-mindedness could be a compelling interest even 
though the Announce Clause was inadequately tailored to promoting that 
goal.103  Given that the prevention of precommitments is the central goal 
animating the Pledge or Promise and the Commit or Appear to Commit 
Clauses, it would have been useful for the Court to have resolved the ques-
tion of whether there is a compelling governmental interest in preventing 
prejudgments.  Perhaps the Court’s careful hedging was simply an instance 
of the general norm of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication.  
On the other hand, given the inevitability of challenges to those other 
clauses, the Court’s refusal to support the essential premises of those clauses 
suggests that they may be in trouble. 
Second, the Court’s conclusion that the Announce Clause was “woe-
fully underinclusive” because it was limited only to statements made during 
election campaigns104 erred in missing the special significance of campaign 
statements.  Such statements differ by their timing, their targeting, their 
mode of dissemination, and their precise content from other statements 
made by judges and candidates about legal issues.  “[C]ampaign speech, 
more than other political speech, is instrumental in character, molded tacti-
cally to accomplish political goals, such as building or sustaining a voting 
majority . . . . There is a reason why politicians employ speechwriters and 
prepare with agonizing care for debates and public appearances . . . .”105  
Moreover, not only is campaign speech aimed especially at the voters to in-
fluence their decisions, it is far more likely to be heard and considered by 
 
102 White, 536 U.S. at 778. 
103 In August 2003, the ABA amended the “terminology” section of the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct to adopt a definition of “impartiality” that includes both “absence of bias or 
prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties”—that is, White’s first 
definition—and “maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before the 
judge,” which is the third, and judicially undetermined, definition of impartiality discussed in 
White.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (amended Aug. 2003). 
104 White, 536 U.S. at 779-80. 
105 Bauer, supra note 63, at 750. 
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the voters than statements in a candidate’s books, memoranda, or even judi-
cial opinions.  Indeed, shortly after White, the Court in McConnell upheld 
the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) that provide 
for restrictive regulation of “electioneering communications” defined as, in-
ter alia, communications concerning candidates made within sixty days be-
fore a general election or thirty days before a primary election.106  The 
Court’s jurisprudence, as well as political common sense, supports the con-
clusion that campaign statements are different from other political speech 
and may be regulated accordingly.107 
The logic that restrictions aimed only at campaign statements are under-
inclusive could doom all canons restricting campaign statements.  A ban on 
only campaign promises or commitments is arguably as under-inclusive as 
restrictions on the campaign-period announcement of political views, and 
this form of underinclusiveness cannot be easily corrected, since a general 
ban on promises and commitments in published statements would surely be 
unconstitutional.  To be sure, the Court left open the possibility that a restric-
tion on campaign promises might not be underinclusive.  But the Court said 
no more than that it is “plausible” that campaign commitments might be 
treated by judges as limiting their discretion.108  This provides an uncertain 
basis for limiting the scope of the Court’s ruling to the Announce Clause. 
White dealt only with Minnesota’s Announce Clause,109 but effectively 
rendered the comparable provisions in other state judicial conduct codes un-
enforceable.  The Missouri Supreme Court so concluded when it dropped its 
 
106 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 686-89 (2003).  Similarly, in rejecting constitu-
tional challenges to BCRA’s political party soft money restrictions, McConnell additionally 
upheld the statute’s definition of state and local political party “federal election activity,” 
which also contains a temporal component:  the treatment of voter registration activity during 
the 120 days preceding a regularly scheduled federal election as “federal election activity.”  
Id. at 671-75. 
107 See also Dennis F. Thompson, Election Time:  Normative Implications of Temporal 
Properties of the Electoral Process in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 51, 61 (2004) 
(arguing that campaign speech differs from other political speech and may be more strictly 
regulated). 
108 White, 536 U.S. at 780. 
109 Technically, all the White Court did was reverse the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants and remand to the Eighth Circuit for further considera-
tion.  Id. at 788.  The Eighth Circuit subsequently remanded the case to the district court with 
directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on their motion for summary judgment on the 
Announce Clause issue, declaring Minnesota’s Announce Clause invalid.  361 F.3d 1035 (8th 
Cir. 2004), vacated and reh’g, en banc, granted sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 
No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
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Announce Clause one month after White was decided,110 and a federal dis-
trict court invalidated the Texas Announce Clause one month after that.111  
The fate of the other canons restricting judicial campaign speech, however, 
is far less clear. 
B.  The Pledges or Promises Clause 
Nearly all states that conduct judicial elections provide that a candidate 
for judicial office “should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office 
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the of-
fice.”112  Like the Announce Clause, the Pledges or Promises Clause grew 
out of the ABA’s 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct.113  But unlike the An-
nounce Clause, it emerged unscathed from the 1990 revisions.114  Moreover, 
even some of the lower courts that were troubled by the Announce Clause 
have either upheld the Pledges or Promises Clause or have indicated that 
they believe a ban on campaign pledges and promises concerning conduct in 
office is constitutional.115  And whereas the Announce Clause was rarely in-
voked prior to White—most of the cases dealing with the Announce Clause 
involved facial challenges to its enforceability116—the Pledges or Promises 
Clause has in recent years been repeatedly enforced by the courts.117  White 
 
110 Order Enforcing Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (Mo. July 18, 2002) (en 
banc), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf/0/ 
f1c626db4da8b14086256bfa0073b302? (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
111 Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A.A-02CV111JRN, 2002 WL 1870038, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 
Aug. 6, 2002). 
112 Moerke, supra note 81, at 266-67 (quoting CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
7B(1)(c) (1972)). 
113 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). 
114 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
115 See, e.g., Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993) (ob-
serving that the Pledges or Promises Clause is as unconstitutionally overbroad as the An-
nounce Clause); J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991) (“[J]udicial candidates 
[cannot] be allowed to make promises or predispositions of cases or issues that are likely to 
come before the courts that might reflect upon a judge’s impartiality.”); see also Order En-
forcing Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (Mo. July 18, 2002) (en banc) (stating 
that the Missouri “pledges or promises” clause “shall otherwise remain in full force and ef-
fect,” though the order provides that the Announce Clause will no longer be enforced), avail-
able at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/ 
sup/index.nsf/0/f1c626db4da8b14086256bfa0073b302? (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
116 See cases cited supra note 87 (presenting a series of cases challenging Announce 
Clauses). 
117 See, e.g., In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 88-89 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (enforcing the 
Pledges or Promises Clause with respect to statements made in a radio interview), cert. de-
nied, 124 S. Ct. 180 (2003); In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 566, 572 (Fla. 2001) (per cu-
riam) (enforcing the Pledges or Promises Clause with respect to statements in a letter); In re 
Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. 2001) (per curiam) (enforcing the Pledges or Promises 
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carefully tiptoed around the Pledges or Promises Clause, although, as previ-
ously indicated, its uncertain treatment of the definition of impartiality and 
of the regulation of only campaign statements calls this Clause into ques-
tion, too. 
Another difficulty for the Pledges or Promises Clause comes from the 
interplay of White and Brown v. Hartlage.118  In Brown, the Supreme Court 
held that a Kentucky law prohibiting any candidate for office from making a 
“promise, agree[ment] or . . . contract with any person to vote for or support 
any particular individual, thing or measure, in consideration for the vote . . . 
of that person”119 could not, consistent with the First Amendment, be ap-
plied to a candidate’s pledge to take less than the statutory salary of the of-
fice he was seeking.120  The Court found that the Constitution protects at 
least some campaign promises because such candidate statements can rein-
force the ability of the people to control their government:  “Candidate com-
mitments enhance the accountability of government officials to the people 
whom they represent, and assist voters in predicting the effect of their 
vote.”121  Nor was it a problem that some of the voters might benefit if the 
candidate, upon election, carried out his pledge: 
[O]ur tradition of political pluralism is partly predicated on the expectation that 
voters will pursue their individual good through the political process . . . . So 
long as the hoped-for personal benefit is to be achieved through the normal 
processes of government, and not through some private arrangement, it has al-
ways been, and remains, a reputable basis upon which to cast one’s ballot.122 
Brown and White together indicate that not only are restrictions on judicial 
candidate speech subject to strict scrutiny, but also that, outside the judicial 
election setting at least, candidates’ pledges and promises enjoy constitu-
tional protection. 
But Brown does not establish that a candidate has an unlimited constitu-
tional right to make campaign promises.  The Court noted that “some kinds 
of promises made by a candidate to voters, and some kinds of promises elic-
ited by voters from candidates, may be declared illegal without constitutional 
 
Clause with respect to statements made as part of a television advertisement); In re Bybee, 
716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) (discussing the risks of judicial pledges); In re 
Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997) (per curiam) (enforcing the Pledges or Promises 
Clause with respect to “campaign materials”); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 2003) (per 
curiam) (enforcing the Pledges or Promises Clause with respect to statements that appeared in 
a letter and newspaper article). 
118 456 U.S. 45 (1982). 
119 Id. at 49 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.055 (Michie 1982)). 
120 Id. at 62. 
121 Id. at 55-56. 
122 Id. at 56. 
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difficulty.”123  Indeed, some kinds of promises by public officials may be 
treated as inconsistent with the nature of public office.  As the Court indi-
cated, in the legislative and executive settings, promises of private benefits 
to individuals may be treated as “corrupt.”124  In the judicial setting, pledges 
or promises to decide certain cases or issues a certain way may be treated as 
inconsistent with the nature of the judicial office and, thus, as the judicial 
equivalent of corruption. 
A judge’s commitment to decide a particular case or issue in a particu-
lar way would violate the duty of the judge to decide cases “in accordance 
with the law and the evidence.”125  Such a precommitment is inconsistent 
with the value of impartiality-as-open-mindedness that White alluded to but 
did not determine.  Although the Supreme Court did not squarely so find, 
surely the protection of impartiality-as-open-mindedness is a compelling 
state interest.126  As the New York Court of Appeals recently put it, “open-
mindedness is central to the judicial function for it ensures that each litigant 
appearing in court has a genuine—as opposed to illusory—opportunity to be 
heard.”127  A judge may enter a case with prior views about the issues pre-
sented, but Due Process requires that the judge’s mind must be “open 
enough to allow reasonable consideration of the legal and factual issues pre-
sented.”128  Although preconceptions may be impossible to avoid, when 
preconceptions harden into prejudgments, the judicial function itself is sub-
verted. 
Even if the prevention of judicial precommitments is a compelling state 
interest, does the Pledges or Promises Clause advance that end?  In other 
words, do campaign pledges and promises raise the danger of pre-
commitments?  The Fifth Circuit once observed that 
the contours of the judicial function make inappropriate the same kind of par-
ticularized pledges of conduct in office that are the very stuff of campaigns for 
most non-judicial offices. . . . [T]he candidate for judicial office . . . cannot, 
consistent with the proper exercise of his judicial powers, bind himself to de-
cide particular cases in order to achieve a given programmatic result.129 
 
123 Id. at 55. 
124 Id. at 58. 
125 In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997) (per curiam). 
126 In the aftermath of White, the ABA adopted, and inserted into the Model Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct, a definition of “impartiality” that includes “maintaining an open mind in con-
sidering issues that may come before the judge.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Ter-
minology (amended Aug. 2003). 
127 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). 
128 Id. 
129 Morial v. Judiciary Comm’n, 565 F.2d 295, 305 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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But, of course, campaign pledges are not binding or legally enforceable.  
Critics of the canons note that politicians do not consistently treat them-
selves as committed to their campaign promises once in office.130  Neverthe-
less, a campaign promise, as opposed to a less specific statement of views, 
can solidify the candidate’s predisposition into a commitment, can impose 
some moral pressure on the judge to honor the campaign pledge when she is 
presiding over a case or issue presenting the subject of the pledge, and can 
lead the litigants who appear before her to “believe that the judge[] will act 
in a way consistent with [her] campaign behavior rather than consistent with 
due process and due course of law.”131  The fact that the pledge is made dur-
ing a campaign means it is more likely that the candidate intends it to be 
taken seriously as a basis for voter decision making.  So, too, making the 
pledge during the campaign makes it more likely that the voters will in fact 
take it seriously and, in a subsequent election, take action if the candidate 
has not lived up to the pledge. 
 Litigants are also more likely to be aware of campaign-period pledges 
and to take them into account in their legal strategies, their arguments to the 
court, and their assessments of the fairness of a court’s decision.  Even if 
such pledges are not always honored, the very fact that the pledge is made 
undercuts the value of judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartial-
ity.  By making such a pledge or promise, the judicial candidate is telling 
the voters that, once on the bench, she will feel free to make decisions in 
cases that she hears based on her campaign statements, rather than the evi-
dence before her, the arguments of the parties, or the legal rules applicable 
to the case at hand.  This is in tension with the judicial oath of office, “has 
the additional deleterious effect of miseducating voters about the role of the 
judiciary,”132 and can foster a public climate in which judicial impartiality 
itself is devalued.133 
 
130 See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 61, at 98 (“[T]he experience with political candidates 
for other offices does not reveal a strong tendency of candidates to stick to their campaign po-
sitions.”); cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are Un-
constitutional, 35 IND. L. REV. 735, 744 (2002) (“A judge who is trying, consciously or un-
consciously, to please the voters will take the politically popular approach, whether or not it 
was expressed previously.”). 
131 In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam); see also Buckley v. Ill. 
Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A candidate] would be under pres-
sure to honor [a pre-commitment] if he won . . . and such a case later came before him.  This 
commitment . . . would hamper the judge’s ability to make an impartial decision and would 
undermine the credibility of his decision to the losing litigant and to the community.”). 
132 In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7. 
133 Cf. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 89 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (finding that a judicial 
candidate’s statement that she would be “absolutely a reflection of what the community 
wants” violates the canons), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 180 (2003). 
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Campaign pledges and promises, thus, at the very least threaten the ap-
pearance of judicial impartiality in much the same way that the Supreme 
Court has found that large campaign contributions create the appearance of 
corruption.134  Much as large donations create a reasonable fear that public 
officials will place private benefits over the public interest in making deci-
sions, campaign pledges and promises create a reasonable fear that the judge 
will not make decisions based on the facts of the case, the evidence before 
her, and the rule of law.  Like large contributions, judicial campaign prom-
ises undermine the legitimacy of government.  Much as government can act 
to limit the undue influence and the appearance of undue influence of large 
contributions on elected representatives, so, too, government can act to pro-
tect public confidence that judges will properly discharge their judicial func-
tion.135 
The Pledges or Promises Clause is properly tailored to the prevention of 
pre-commitments.  The Clause focuses on language that pledges the candidate 
to pursue a certain course of action.  If honored, such a pledge would pre-
clude a judge from having an open mind.  But the Clause does not prevent a 
candidate from announcing his views on an issue and informing the voters 
about his general approach to particular legal questions.  To be sure, the dif-
ference in practice between the announcement of views and the making of a 
pledge may be thin.  Certainly, many voters will hear announcements of 
views as commitments to future decisions, and candidates may very well 
intend voters to hear just that.  But the language of pledge or promise sig-
nals not simply that a candidate has views on an issue but that he has pre-
judged future cases in which that issue will arise.  The extra moral obliga-
tion that may arise from promissory language and the direct challenge to the 
norm of open-mindedness that results from a pledge make these statements 
significantly different from the mere announcement of views.  The Pledges 
or Promises Clause is narrowly tailored to preclude the harm to the judicial 
function created by promissory language without interfering with the bene-
 
134 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam). 
135 Indeed, in a recent survey, 95% of state judges strongly supported the statement that 
“[j]udicial candidates should never make promises during elections about how they will rule 
in cases that may come before them.”  Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Res. Inc., Justice at Stake 
Campaign, Justice at Stake—State Judges Frequency Questionnaire question 34, at 12 (Nov. 
5, 2001-Jan. 2, 2002),  available at http:// 
www.greenbergresearch.com/publications/reports/fqjJASjudges.pdf (last accessed Oct. 7, 
2004). 
 214 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 183 
fits of free expression, voter information, and competitive elections that 
arise out of the freedom of candidates to tell voters their views.136 
C.  The Commit or Appear to Commit Clause 
As previously noted, in 1990 the ABA dropped the Announce Clause 
from its Model Code of Judicial Conduct and replaced it with a provision 
that a judicial candidate not “make statements that commit or appear to 
commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are 
likely to come before the court.”137  By the time of the White decision, 
twenty-seven states had adopted canons tracking the ABA’s language.138  
Prior to White, a handful of courts that had invalidated the Announce Clause 
had also upheld the Commit Clause.139  Because Minnesota had not adopted 
the Commit Clause, White did not address its constitutionality, although the 
Court’s treatment of the meaning of impartiality and the problems of focus-
ing on campaign statements raises the same uncertainties for the Commit 
Clause that it does for the Pledges or Promises Clause. 
To be sure, one sentence in one of White’s footnotes constitutes a more 
direct, albeit highly ambiguous, challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Commit Clause.  As the Court explained, at oral argument respondents con-
tended that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s narrowing construction of the 
Announce Clause rendered its scope “no broader than” the Commit 
Clause.140  The Court labeled that argument “somewhat curious,” as the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had rejected a proposal to replace the Announce 
Clause with the Commit Clause.141  The Court then stated:  “We do not 
know whether the announce clause (as interpreted by state authorities) and 
the 1990 ABA canon [that is, the Commit Clause,] are one and the same.  
No aspect of our constitutional analysis turns on this question.”142  Certainly 
one plausible reading of this delphic statement is that even if the Announce 
 
136 Cf. Alan B. Morrison, The Judge Has No Robes:  Keeping the Electorate in the Dark 
About What Judges Think About the Issues, 36 IND. L. REV. 719, 724-26 (2003) (condemning 
the Announce Clause but arguing that the Pledges or Promises Clause is constitutional). 
137 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
138 Moerke, supra note 81, at 268. 
139 See, e.g., Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 
(W.D. Ky. 1991) (finding that the Commit Clause passes strict scrutiny and does not violate a 
candidate’s free speech rights); Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 
205 (Ky. 1994) (stating that “there is a compelling state interest in so limiting judicial cam-
paign speech, because the making of campaign commitments on issues likely to come before 
the court tends to undermine the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system”). 
140 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 773 n.5 (2002). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 774 n.5. 
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Clause were the equivalent of the Commit Clause, it would still have been 
unconstitutional.  That would surely spell the doom of the Commit Clause.  
However, it is unlikely that the Court’s statement was intended to resolve 
the constitutionality of the Commit Clause.  The White respondents had 
sought to import only the “likely to come before the court”143 language of 
the Commit Clause into the Announce Clause in order to narrow the latter 
clause’s very broad proscription of the announcement of “views on disputed 
legal or political issues.”144  Two courts of appeals, including the Eighth 
Circuit in White, had previously narrowed and upheld the Announce Clause 
by reading in “likely to come before the court.”145  The Court’s statement 
indicates that even if the Announce Clause had been limited to announce-
ments concerning legal and political issues “likely to come before the court” 
it still would have failed to pass constitutional muster because it still would 
not have been properly aimed at promoting the interest in impartiality-as-
open-mindedness (assuming that impartiality-as-open-mindedness is a com-
pelling governmental interest).  But there is nothing in the case to suggest 
that the lower court or the respondents thought that the Announce Clause’s 
proscription of the “announcing” of views reached no further than state-
ments of commitment.  It is highly implausible to suggest that “announce” 
and “commit” mean the same thing. 
Rather, statements committing a candidate with respect to a case, con-
troversy, or issue are likely to resemble pledges and promises in both con-
tent and effect.  So, too, like the Pledges or Promises Clause, the proscrip-
tion of candidate commitments with respect to cases, controversies, or 
issues promotes the interests in protecting judicial impartiality-as-open-
mindedness and the appearance of such impartiality—interests that ought to 
be constitutionally compelling.  As the Kentucky Supreme Court observed 
in upholding the enforcement of that state’s Commit Clause, “[j]ustice can 
hardly be blind if the judge has made a pre-election commitment or pre-
judgment which causes him or her to apply the blindfold only as to one side 
of an issue.”146 
Indeed, the concept of commitment is sufficiently similar to the notion 
of pledge or promise that it is not completely clear what the Commit Clause 
adds to the Pledges or Promises Clause.  Perhaps it has the benefit of assur-
ing that the regulation is not limited to campaign statements that use the 
 
143 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
144 White, 536 U.S. at 768 (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5A(3)(d)(i) (2000)). 
145 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2001); Stretton v. 
Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991). 
146 Deters v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Ky. 1994). 
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magic words of “pledge” or “promise.”  If so, the effect would be similar to 
Congress’s recent action in the campaign finance area of adopting restric-
tions on “electioneering communication” in order to undo the effect of court 
decisions that had narrowly limited the prior statutory term “expenditure” to 
so-called “express advocacy.”147  In that case, it would be the Pledges or 
Promises Clause, which would cover a subset of the pre-commitments that 
fall within the Commit Clause, rather than the Commit Clause that is redun-
dant. 
The history of the Commit Clause suggests that it was derived from the 
Announce Clause and was intended to approach the Pledges or Promises 
Clause.  But other than indicating that it is the concept of pre-commitment 
that is being regulated, rather than specific linguistic forms, it is not clear 
what particular work the Commit Clause does, and probably the Pledges or 
Promises Clause and the Commit Clause ought to be merged.  Indeed, in its 
latest amendments to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the ABA has 
done precisely that by proposing language that in a single clause prohibits 
judicial candidates from making “pledges, promises or commitments that 
are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of 
the office.”148 
The Commit Clause goes beyond the Pledges or Promises Clause in one 
significant but troubling respect.  The canon precludes not just commit-
ments but statements that “appear to commit” a candidate to a specific 
course of judicial action.149  That would be unexceptionable if the only ef-
fect of the phrase were to indicate that the Commit Clause is not limited to 
statements that use the magic word “commit” but extends to any statement 
that, in context, would be treated by the reasonable listener as making a 
commitment rather than merely expressing a viewpoint, regardless of the 
precise words used.  The danger, however, is that statements of judicial phi-
losophy or political belief could be treated by a state supreme court or a 
state judicial conduct commission as appearing to make a commitment even 
 
147 See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 650–54 (2003) (describing the wordplay in-
volved in statutory construction around campaign finance reform). 
148 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5A(3)(d) (amended Aug. 2003).  Simi-
larly, some state supreme courts have revised their canons to subsume the prohibition on 
pledges and promises into the broader Commit Clause.  Thus, Canon 5B fo the California 
Code of Judicial Ethics (amended Dec. 22, 2003) states:  “A candidate for election or ap-
pointment to judicial office shall not (1) make statements to the electorate or the appointing 
authority that commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that could 
come before the courts . . . .”  Canon 7B(1)(b)of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct  
(amended Jan. 7, 2004) provides simply that a candidate for “any judicial office that is filled 
by public election between competing candidates . . . shall not make statements that commit 
the candidate with respect to issues likely to come before the court.” 
149 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990). 
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if the language used by the candidate did not state that the candidate viewed 
himself bound to a specific decision. 
Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court sanctioned a candidate who labeled 
himself a “pro-life candidate,” finding that self-description “appeared to 
commit him to a position not only on abortion matters, but also on other 
controversies.”150  Yet, surely a judge could consider himself pro-life as a 
matter of personal philosophy without feeling bound to reach a particular 
result in a case involving right-to-life issues if the evidence and the law 
pointed in the other direction.  Similarly, the New York State Judicial Con-
duct Commission found that a candidate who identified herself as a “[l]aw 
and order [c]andidate” had “committed, or appeared to commit, [herself] to 
a pro-prosecution bias in criminal cases.”151  Again, announcing that one is 
a “law and order” judge does not commit a judge to resolve all issues 
against defendants.  Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals, which has 
vigorously defended the constitutionality of the canons, concluded that 
“simply using the phrase ‘law and order’ in judicial campaign literature 
does not amount to misconduct” since the phrase does not “compromise[] 
judicial impartiality.”152  In another case, the Washington Supreme Court 
held that a candidate who proclaimed himself “toughest on drunk driving” 
violated the Appear to Commit Clause by suggesting a precommitment in 
DWI cases, but that the same judge’s statement that he was a “tough, no-
nonsense judge” was permissible since the claim “suggest[s] nothing more 
than a strict application of the law.”153  These cases illustrate the vagueness 
and potential breadth of the Appear to Commit prohibition. 
The Commit Clause, like the Pledges or Promises Clause, can be consti-
tutionally applied only to statements which go beyond the expression of 
views concerning legal and political issues and use language—not limited to 
the specific words “pledge,” “promise,” or “commit”—indicating that the 
candidate will, while on the bench, render decisions according to the com-
mitment without due regard to the facts or law in a particular case.  How-
ever, as the Kentucky, New York, and Washington cases indicate, the re-
striction on statements that “appear to commit” a candidate is vague and, if 
applied to such non-promissory phrases as “right to life” or “law and order 
candidate,” goes too far in restricting candidate language that expresses a 
viewpoint but does not indicate an intention to limit the judge’s freedom of 
action.  It is, thus, of doubtful constitutionality.  Indeed, two state courts that 
recently revised their canons, California and Georgia, retained the pre-White 
 
150 Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 203. 
151 In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 736 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam). 
152 Id. at 736-37. 
153 In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 396 (Wash. 1988) (emphasis omitted). 
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prohibition on commitments but dropped the restriction on statements that 
“appear to commit” a candidate.154  The California Advisory Committee 
specifically noted that “the phrase ‘appear to commit’ has been deleted be-
cause . . . the phrase may have been overinclusive.”155  Similarly, in August 
2003 the ABA amended its Model Code of Judicial Conduct to eliminate the 
proscription of statements that merely “appear” to commit the candidate.156 
D.  Misrepresentations Clause 
The most frequently challenged provision of the state judicial campaign 
canons appears to be the restriction on false and misleading statements.  The 
1972 ABA Code stated that a candidate for judicial office “should not . . . 
misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.”157  
The 1990 Model Code significantly modified the canon to provide that a ju-
dicial candidate may not “knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifica-
tions, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or an oppo-
nent.”158  As one commentator recently noted, “[m]ost states with elected 
judges have adopted one of these versions of the misrepresent clause.”159 
In recent cases, courts have repeatedly invalidated the 1972 version of 
the Misrepresentations Clause, while indicating that the 1990 version would 
pass constitutional muster.160  These courts have indicated that a require-
ment of intentional falsity—and the exclusion of innocent or negligent mis-
statements—is an essential predicate for regulation.  Relying on White’s ap-
plication of strict scrutiny to judicial campaign codes, the Eleventh Circuit 
recently determined that “[n]egligent misstatements must be protected in 
 
154 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B(1) (amended Dec. 22, 2003); GA. CODE 
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(b) (amended Jan. 7, 2004). 
155 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B Advisory Comm. Cmt. (amended Dec. 
22, 2003). 
156 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990).  As amended, the 
canon now provides that a judicial candidate shall not, “with respect to cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises or commitments that 
are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office.”  
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (amended Aug. 2003). 
157 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972). 
158 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) (1990). 
159 Moerke, supra note 81, at 310. 
160 See, e.g., Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (narrowing Geor-
gia’s canon to forbid only intentional dissemination of misrepresentations); Butler v. Ala. Ju-
dicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 218 (Ala. 2001) (narrowing the Alabama canon to 
forbid only dissemination of demonstrable falsehoods with actual malice); In re Chmura, 608 
N.W.2d 31, 43 (Mich. 2000) (narrowing the Michigan canon to prohibit only knowing or 
reckless misrepresentations). 
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order to give protected speech the ‘breathing space’ it requires.”161  The 
Michigan Supreme Court similarly reasoned that the “debate” concerning 
the “overall direction of the courts” that should take place during a judicial 
election would be “impossible if judicial candidates are overly fearful of po-
tential discipline for what they say” and, accordingly, held that the prohibi-
tion of misrepresentations had to be limited to knowing or reckless false-
hoods.162  As a result of these and similar decisions, most state judicial 
campaign codes now prohibit only intentional or reckless falsehoods.163 
Even as so limited, is such a restriction on judicial campaign speech 
constitutional?  Misrepresentations, even intentional ones, do not threaten 
the compelling interest in impartiality-as-open-mindedness that ought to 
save the Pledges or Promises Clause and the Commit Clause.  Most of the 
courts that have considered challenges to the Misrepresentations Clause 
have focused on the relatively amorphous interest in “judicial integrity,” 
finding that the ban on misrepresentations is necessary “so as not to damage 
the actual and perceived integrity” of the courts.164  In this view, uncivil, 
undignified “mudslinging” by judicial candidates—language normal to, if 
not expected of, executive and legislative candidates who operate in the 
rough and tumble world of politics—is considered to be a “threat to judicial 
integrity and public confidence in the judiciary.”165 
It is not clear if the interest in integrity is unique to the judiciary, or 
whether the integrity of the judiciary is more threatened by candidate mis-
representations than the integrity of elected executives and legislators.  
Surely, there is a public interest in the honesty of all elected officials and in 
the public’s confidence in the honesty of all those in power.  Nor is it clear 
that the reputation of the judiciary is more fragile and more subject to the 
loss of public confidence than the reputations of the other branches of gov-
ernment, so that a special restriction on judicial candidate speech in the 
name of integrity is justified.  The canon limits the speech of judicial candi-
dates who, if elected, can claim the same public mandate and legitimacy as 
 
161 Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1320. 
162 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 42-43. 
163 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Weaver, the Georgia Supreme Court 
revised its Code of Judicial Conduct to narrow the ban on misrepresentation to apply only to 
candidates’ publishing “a false statement of fact concerning themselves or their candidacies, 
or concerning any opposing candidate or candidacy, with knowledge of the statement’s falsity 
or with reckless disregard for the statement’s truth or falsity.”  GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (amended Jan. 7, 2004). 
164 Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984); accord Butler, 802 
So. 2d at 215 (protecting the “reputation and integrity of the judiciary is a compelling state 
interest”). 
165 Long, supra note 68, at 803. 
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all other elected officials.  It is not obvious why they, unlike their appointed 
counterparts, need the special mantle of being outside or above the hurly-
burly of politics.  Moreover, it is not clear how well a ban on misrepresenta-
tions limited to knowing falsehoods actually promotes the image of judicial 
“civility and dignity”166 that defenders of the canons consider necessary to 
preserve the public’s belief in the integrity of the judiciary.  As so circum-
scribed, the Misrepresentations Clause permits “hyperbole, parody, epi-
thet[s]” and “‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks.’”167  These can be as nasty as any statements in legislative and 
executive elections and far more in tension with the goal of civil and digni-
fied judicial elections than low-key, calmly expressed falsehoods.168 
 
Perhaps the better defense of the Misrepresentations Clause is not that it 
promotes judicial integrity but that it advances the public interest in in-
formed judicial elections.  Candidate falsehoods are inconsistent with the 
goal of an informed electorate advanced by the application of strict scrutiny 
to judicial campaign codes.  In recent cases involving sanctions for misrep-
resentations, candidates have been found to have lied about their qualifica-
tions and the qualifications of their opponents;169 about an opponent’s judi-
cial record;170 and about the content or nature of the endorsements they had 
received.171  Such misrepresentations actually make it harder for the public 
to get the information it needs to make an accurate and educated assessment 
of judicial candidates.  The ban on misrepresentations thus serves the inter-
est in the integrity of the electoral process by “protecting the political proc-
 
166 Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges:  Is There One “Best” Method?, 
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995). 
167 In re Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 886. 
168 See Mark Kozlowski, Should the Regulation of Judicial Candidate Speech Regarding 
Legal and Political Issues Be Reconsidered?, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 161, 167 (2001) (predicting 
that recent decisions limiting the Misrepresentations Clause to knowing falsehoods will “en-
courage the use of the underhanded allegation and the cheap shot that may be said to fall short 
of being outright falsehoods”). 
169 See, e.g., In re Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam) (determining 
that a judicial candidate had misrepresented her qualifications); In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 
735, 737 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam) (“[P]etitioner misrepresented her educational back-
ground.”). 
170 See, e.g., In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957, 962 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam) (“Respon-
dent’s . . . purpose was to create an impression that Judge Clem was causing needless delays 
and holding a large number of cases under advisement when there was contrary evidence be-
fore her . . . .”). 
171 See, e.g., Summe v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Ky. 
1997) (finding that candidate promulgated campaign literature that looked like a newspaper’s 
independent endorsement of her candidacy); In re Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422, 426, 428 (Ohio 
1999) (fining and reprimanding candidate for misleading endorsements). 
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ess from distortions caused by false or inaccurate statements” at least as 
much as it promotes dignity and civility in judicial elections.172  By limiting 
the restriction to knowing falsehoods, the Misrepresentations Clause mini-
mizes interference with robust political debate while still barring statements 
that actually make it harder for the public to make an informed decision. 
The 1990 version of the Misrepresentations Clause ought to pass consti-
tutional muster.  Because it regulates only knowing falsehoods, it is not 
even certain whether the clause would trigger strict judicial scrutiny, as the 
Supreme Court has indicated in other settings that knowing falsehoods can 
be penalized.173  Even if the Misrepresentations Clause does trigger strict 
scrutiny, the interest in informed electoral decision making is a compelling 
one and ought to justify such a restriction on candidate speech. 
Unlike the issues raised by the Pledges or Promises and the Commit 
Clause, it is not clear whether the fate of the Misrepresentations Clause 
ought to turn on the distinct character of the judicial function or the special 
nature of judicial elections.  The same concern over informed voter decision 
making ought to provide the compelling interest that would support a gen-
eral prohibition on candidates’ knowingly making false statements in elec-
tions.  Indeed, one study in 2001 found that seventeen states prohibit false 
speech concerning political candidates.174  It is probably the case that the 
belief that judicial elections are special, and that judicial candidates should 
be held to higher standards of civility, dignity, and integrity, explains why 
the Misrepresentations Clause was initially adopted and continues to be re-
tained.  But its constitutionality is better supported by the compelling inter-
est in informed voter decision making, an interest just as applicable to legis-
lative and executive elections as to judicial elections.175 
 
172 In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 40. 
173 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) (“States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood 
injurious to the reputation of a private individual.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 279-80 (1964) (allowing public officials to recover damages only if a newspaper know-
ingly or recklessly publishes false items about them); see also Garrison v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 
64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of 
democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political 
change is to be effected.”). 
174 Becky Kruse, Comment, The Truth in Masquerade:  Regulating False Ballot Propo-
sition Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 132 (2001).  Ten 
of those states, plus one other state, also prohibit false speech concerning ballot propositions.  
Id. 
175 There is little case law on whether states can prohibit falsehoods by campaign par-
ticipants outside the context of judicial elections.  Two federal district courts have held that 
barring knowingly false statements in political campaigns could be constitutional, but found 
the particular statutes before them flawed on procedural grounds.  In Vanasco v. Schwartz, 
401 F. Supp. 87, 93-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d mem., 423 U.S. 1041 (1976), the court agreed 
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E.  Personal Solicitation of Campaign Contributions 
Canon 5C(2) of the ABA Model Code provides that a judicial candidate 
“shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions.”176  Instead, 
the candidate is authorized to establish “committees of responsible persons” 
that may “solicit and accept” campaign contributions.177  Virtually all states 
that conduct judicial elections have adopted the ban on judicial candidates’ 
personal solicitation of campaign contributions.178  Prior to White, this ban, 
unlike the Announce and Misrepresentations Clauses, had been consistently 
validated and enforced in the courts.179 
 
that campaign statements made with “actual malice,” that is, with the knowledge that they are 
false or with reckless disregard of whether they are false, are unprotected by the First 
Amendment, but concluded that the New York law penalizing campaign misrepresentations 
was unconstitutionally overbroad because of its failure to include an actual malice require-
ment.  The court also found that the statute’s enforcement mechanism—an administrative pro-
ceeding brought by the state board of elections, without judicial review—provided an uncon-
stitutional and inadequate method for protecting the free speech rights at stake.  Id. at 99-100.  
In Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission, 670 F. Supp. 1368, 1370, 1375 (S.D. Ohio 1987), 
the court found that the statute prohibiting the making of campaign falsehoods “knowingly 
and with intent to affect the outcome of such campaign” properly criminalized speech “not 
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment,” but, as in Vanasco, concluded that the ad-
ministrative procedure for enforcing the ban was unconstitutional.  The Sixth Circuit subse-
quently agreed that Ohio could prohibit knowingly false campaign statements.  Pestrak v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573, 577 (6th Cir. 1991).   
 One state court has invalidated a state law prohibiting political advertisements that in-
clude intentional falsehoods concerning material facts.  In State ex rel. Public Disclosure 
Commission v. 119 Vote No! Committee, 957 P.2d 691, 696-97 (Wash. 1998), a narrow ma-
jority of the Washington Supreme Court determined that even malicious campaign falsehoods 
must receive full First Amendment protection.  119 Vote No! Committee dealt primarily with 
the statute’s application to ballot proposition campaigns, but the court’s ruling invalidated the 
application of the anti-false-statement law to candidate campaigns as well.  Id. at 697-98.  Wash-
ington subsequently adopted a law penalizing political advertising made with actual malice “that 
contains a false statement of material fact about a candidate for public office,” but exempted 
“statements made by a candidate or the candidate’s agent about the candidate himself or her-
self.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.530(1)(a) (West 2000). 
 More recently, in McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commission, 729 N.E.2d 364, 375 (Ohio 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1078 (2001), the Ohio Supreme Court, after full review of the 
First Amendment issues, enforced an Ohio law prohibiting the dissemination with actual mal-
ice of a false statement concerning a candidate that is designed to promote the election or de-
feat of the candidate. 
176 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(2) (1990). 
177 Id. 
178 See Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections, 35 
IND. L. REV. 659, 666 (2002) (noting that thirty-five of the thirty-nine states that have judicial 
elections ban candidates’ personal solicitations of contributions). 
179 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 883-85 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(enforcing a ban on personal solicitation of campaign funds); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 
F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991) (allowing the states to prohibit personal solicitation by candidate 
in order to avoid the appearance of coercion); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 44 (Or. 1990) (per 
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In Weaver v. Bonner, however, the Eleventh Circuit, relying on White, 
determined that Georgia’s ban on the personal solicitation of campaign 
funds by judicial candidates was unconstitutional.180  Weaver determined 
that the ban failed strict scrutiny because it was “not narrowly tailored to 
serve Georgia’s compelling interest in judicial impartiality.”181  Strict scru-
tiny applied because the ban “chilled” judicial candidates “from speaking to 
potential contributors” about their potential contributions.182  Apparently as-
suming that the prevention of impartiality—in this case, bias in favor of the 
donor—is a compelling state interest, the Eleventh Circuit determined that 
the ban did not promote that interest since “the fact that judicial candidates 
require financial support” to run successful campaigns “does not suggest 
that they will be partial if they are elected.”183  On the other hand, “even if 
there is a risk that judges will be tempted to rule a particular way because of 
contributions or endorsements, this risk is not significantly reduced” by re-
quiring that the candidate seek contributions through a committee rather 
than personally.184  “Successful candidates will feel beholden to the people 
who helped them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of sup-
port.”185 
 
curiam) (upholding the constitutionality of a ban on personal solicitation); In re Tennant, 516 
S.E.2d 496 (W. Va. 1999) (enforcing a ban on personal solicitation of funds as necessary to 
reduce potential pressure on lawyers to contribute to a particular campaign); cf. Suster v. Mar-
shall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (upholding a prohibition on a judicial candi-
date from spending money raised in connection with a campaign for non-judicial office, in 
part in order to backstop the ban on personal solicitation of judicial campaign funds). 
 One of the plaintiffs in White did challenge the Minnesota canon barring a candidate’s per-
sonal solicitation of campaign contributions.  The plaintiff acknowledged that the ban served 
the compelling state interest of preventing a threat to judicial impartiality and preventing the 
appearance of judicial impropriety.  Kelly, 247 F.3d at 883-84.  However, he argued that the ban 
was not narrowly tailored since the prevention of impropriety and the appearance of impropri-
ety could be advanced by permitting a judicial candidate to make solicitations to large groups 
and to send out letters requesting money but requiring that contributions be sent to a campaign 
committee that would be barred from disclosing the identity of contributors to the candidate.  Id. at 
884.  The Eighth Circuit, however, concluded that the plaintiff’s alternative would not obviate 
the appearance of impropriety that results from personal solicitation and the “appearance, ac-
curate or not, that ‘justice is for sale’ and the expectation of impermissible favoritism.”  Id.  
The plaintiffs in White did not include a question relating to the personal solicitation restric-
tion in their petition for certiorari.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1040 
(8th Cir. 2004).  Consequently, the issue did not come before the Supreme Court. 
180 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1322-23. 
185 Id. at 1323. 
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Perhaps influenced by the Weaver decision, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court revised its Code of Judicial Conduct in 2003 to expressly permit a ju-
dicial candidate to “personally solicit campaign funds.”186  The Maine Su-
preme Court, however, was unpersuaded by the Eleventh Circuit’s reason-
ing, holding that the ban on personal solicitation was justified because “[i]t 
is exactly this activity that potentially creates a bias, or at least the appear-
ance of bias, for or against a party to a proceeding.”187  Similarly, the Eighth 
Circuit panel, in its reconsideration of White on remand from the Supreme 
Court, agreed that the ban on personal solicitation promotes “a kind of 
open-mindedness—keeping candidates free from obligations that would 
hamper their ability to decide the law according to their own judgment 
rather than in accordance with implicit obligations to their financial bene-
factors.”188 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is not simply internally contradictory; it 
is unpersuasive.  The Supreme Court, in cases from Buckley through 
McConnell, has repeatedly held that campaign contributions raise the dan-
gers of corruption—defined as candidates too compliant with the wishes of 
their donors—and appearance of corruption and that, accordingly, contribu-
tions to candidates may be limited.  Surely, solicitation—the act of asking 
for a contribution—raises the same dangers of undue influence and the ap-
pearance of impropriety as the contribution itself.  Indeed, personal solicita-
tion highlights the dangers of abuse by focusing on the potentially coercive 
nature of the request for contributions aimed at a potential donor who has or 
is likely to have business before the judge seeking the contribution.  Per-
sonal solicitation, thus, particularly threatens the appearance of impropriety 
and undermines the appearance of evenhanded treatment essential to the ju-
dicial role. 
The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on contributions are not 
subject to strict scrutiny.189  Contribution limits, the Court has determined, 
“entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage 
 
186 N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(4) (amended Apr. 2, 2004).  The 
court’s decision has been criticized by district court judges and trial lawyers in the state.  See, 
e.g., Matthew Eisley, Election Rules Relaxed for Judges:  Permission to Solicit Lawyers for 
Money Brings a Fear of ‘Shakedowns,’ NAT’L L.J., Oct.  13, 2003, at 7 (citing several attor-
neys’ fears regarding personal solicitation of campaign funds). 
187 In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 351 (Me. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1722 (2004). 
188 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1048 (2004).  This opinion was 
subsequently vacated when the Eighth Circuit determined to grant rehearing en banc.  Repub-
lican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232, at *4 
(8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
189 McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 656-57 (2003); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 
528 U.S. 377, 386-88 (2000). 
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in free communication.”190  The restriction on donors is marginal because a 
donor who has hit the contribution ceiling can continue to participate in the 
campaign through independent expenditures or other forms of political ex-
pression.  The only significant constitutional concern raised by a contribu-
tion limitation is whether it would “prevent[] candidates and political com-
mittees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”191 
The restriction on personal solicitation by a candidate should be subject 
to the same less rigorous standard of review as the restriction on contribu-
tions.  The ban on personal solicitation does not interfere with the candi-
date’s freedom to speak in support of her candidacy since it does not restrict 
any speech by the candidate about his campaign other than the pitch for a 
donation.  Nor does the ban restrict the ability of potential supporters to do-
nate to the judicial candidate’s campaign.  In that sense, the ban on personal 
solicitation of contributions is less restrictive than the contribution ceilings 
that the Court has repeatedly upheld.  The only constitutional issue is 
whether prohibiting personal solicitation, and requiring the candidate in-
stead to rely on her campaign committee to solicit donations, fatally under-
mines the ability of candidates to wage financially viable campaigns.192  
With more and more money being poured into judicial election campaigns, 
it would be difficult to find that the ban on personal solicitation has inter-
fered with the ability of judicial candidates to amass the necessary campaign 
resources.193 
In some states the ban on personal solicitation might arguably be un-
constitutional because of its limited reach.  Although the ABA canon bans 
personal solicitation, it does not prohibit the judicial candidate from learn-
ing the identities of her financial supporters.  The Georgia ban was similarly 
limited, a fact relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit in Weaver v. Bonner.194  
 
190 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) (per curiam). 
191 Id. at 21; accord McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 655-57; Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395-97. 
192 A ban on personal solicitation that continues to permit solicitation through agents is 
distinguishable from the restriction on solicitation subject to strict judicial scrutiny.  See Riley 
v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) (subjecting the speech of 
professional fundraisers to strict scrutiny). 
193 See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 58, at 850 (stating that in the 2000 elections, state 
supreme court candidates raised $45.5 million, a 61% increase over the previous peak in 1998, 
and set fundraising records in ten of the twenty states that held such elections); GOLDBERG & 
SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 15-16 (noting that in 2000 and 2001 ten state supreme court can-
didates raised more than $1 million apiece for their campaigns; in Ohio, the four candidates 
for state supreme court together raised more than $6.2 million; and in Texas, the ten candi-
dates together raised more than $5.8 million). 
194 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002).  Not all state versions of the ban on personal 
solicitations are so limited.  The Minnesota canon considered by the Eighth Circuit panels in 
Kelly and in White, on remand from the Supreme Court, includes a provision prohibiting the 
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Is the threat to judicial impartiality and to the appearance of impartiality—
as well as the potential coercion of donors—qualitatively greater when the 
candidate solicits the contribution personally?  The answer should be “Yes.”  
Personal solicitation can easily involve a personal meeting between candi-
date and donor, with a handshake and the opportunity for each to look the 
other in the eye while the candidate makes his pitch.  Similarly, a personal 
telephone call can heighten the sense of direct contact between the candi-
date and the donor.  Even without language of pledge or promise the candi-
date is likely to have a heightened sense of gratitude to the donor and subse-
quent sympathy for the donor’s interests if the candidate, when in office, is 
ever called upon to make a decision involving that donor’s interest.  More-
over, the candidate’s personal solicitation makes it that much harder for the 
potential donor to say “No,” because the donor knows that the candidate 
knows that the donor has been directly asked for a contribution; the failure 
to contribute may be treated as a matter of hostility rather than indifference.  
From the public’s perspective, the appearance of the possibility of special 
treatment is likely to be much greater if it is known that the candidate per-
sonally solicited a contribution from someone who later had a matter before 
the candidate-as-judge. 
These concerns about the heightened potential for favoritism, coercion, 
and the appearance of special treatment arising from personal solicitation 
are applicable to all elections and conceivably might be used to justify a 
comparable restriction in other settings.195  But two factors distinctive to the 
judicial setting strengthen the case for the canon.  First, whereas legislators 
and executives regularly meet with individuals and the representatives of 
interest groups in private, one-sided sessions in which those individuals or 
interest groups are free to advocate their concerns and seek support, the na-
ture of the judicial function ordinarily precludes private or ex parte contacts 
between a judge and a party who has an interest before the judge.  Personal 
 
candidate’s campaign committee from disclosing to the candidate either the identity of cam-
paign contributors or the identity of those who were solicited for contributions but declined to 
contribute.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1049 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated 
and reh’g, en banc, granted sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-
4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
195 Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS:  A NEW PARADIGM 
FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 25-44, 93-110 (2002) (proposing a system of anonymous donations 
in which campaign contributors give to candidates through a blind trust).  Like the ban on per-
sonal solicitations, the Ackerman and Ayres proposal for anonymous donations seeks to sever the 
tie between donors and candidates without limiting the size of contributions.  The Ackerman 
and Ayres proposal would permit candidates to personally solicit contributions, but candidates 
would be unable to know whether and how much these solicited donors contributed.  In mak-
ing their proposal, Ackerman and Ayres they rely in part on the state canons that prohibit ju-
dicial candidates from learning the identities of their donors.  Id. at 109. 
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meetings or other contacts by judges with donors and potential donors 
would thus pose a greater threat to the appearance of impartiality and to im-
partiality itself than would meetings of other elected officials with donors.  
Second, a disproportionate fraction of contributions to judicial candidates 
comes from two discrete interest groups:  lawyers who are likely to appear 
before the judges and clients who have regular interests before the courts.196  
This exacerbates the sense that personal solicitation undermines impartiality 
and the appearance of impartiality, as well as underscores the concern that 
personal solicitations raise the danger of coercion.197  Thus, whether or not a 
ban on personal solicitation of campaign contributions could be enforced 
against legislative and executive candidates, it ought to be constitutional in 
the special context of judicial elections. 
F.  Restrictions on Partisan Political Activity 
The ABA Model Code includes provisions, which most states have 
adopted, precluding judges from participating in a range of partisan political 
activity other than support for their own campaigns.  These forbidden activi-
ties typically include holding office in a political party, publicly endorsing 
or opposing another candidate for public office, making speeches for a po-
litical party, or soliciting funds for or making contributions to a political 
party.198  Even states that provide for partisan judicial elections may adopt 
restraints on the partisan political activities of judicial candidates. 
White did not address the constitutionality of restrictions on partisan 
behavior.  Although the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct’s limits on 
partisan activities were challenged by the plaintiffs, upheld by the Eighth 
Circuit,199 and raised in the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari, the Supreme 
 
196 GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 17-18.  But cf. Schotland, supra note 58, at 
856 (“[W]hile many judicial campaigns are funded significantly by lawyers’ contributions, by 
no means is that a prevailing pattern.”). 
197 See In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 41 (Or. 1990) (per curiam) (“[T]he spectacle of law-
yers or potential litigants directly handing over money to judicial candidates should be 
avoided if the public is to have faith in the impartiality of its judiciary.”). 
198 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B (1990).  For recent cases applying 
these and similar prohibitions, see In re McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002) (stating 
that “a judge may not publicly endorse a candidate for public office”); Shake v. Ethics Com-
mittee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 122 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Ky. 2003) (holding that “a judge or 
judicial candidate may not make a contribution in order to attend a political fundraiser”); In re 
Shea, 815 So. 2d 813, 817-18 (La. 2002) (per curiam) (censuring a judge for even a “good 
faith” violation of the prohibition on “contributions to other candidates”); see also Suster v. 
Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 698 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing examples of state regulation of par-
tisan activity by judges), aff’d, 149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998). 
199 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 868-76 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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Court limited its review to the Announce Clause.200  After White, the consti-
tutionality of restrictions on the political activities of judges and judicial 
candidates was sharply called into question in Spargo v. New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct,201 a federal district court decision involv-
ing a New York town justice and state supreme court judicial candidate who 
attended a Conservative Party fundraising dinner and served as keynote 
speaker at the event.202  Relying on White, the court subjected the restric-
tions on partisan political activity to strict judicial scrutiny and concluded 
that they were not narrowly tailored to promote the state’s interests in judi-
cial impartiality and independence.203  Moreover, the court’s opinion sug-
gested that even a more modest restriction on the political activity of judges 
would not pass muster so long as the state continued to elect judges in parti-
san elections: 
[A] wholesale prohibition on participating in political activity for fear of influ-
encing a judge ignores the fact that a judicial candidate must have at one time 
participated in politics or would not find him or herself in the position of a 
candidate. . . . [A] rule prohibiting an elected judge or judicial candidate from 
participating in politics is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest in 
an independent judiciary.  This is particularly true in light of the political proc-
ess by which judges are elected.204 
A few months later, however, the New York Court of Appeals strongly 
affirmed the constitutionality of the state’s restrictions on judicial candidate 
political behavior.  In re Raab205 involved a disciplinary proceeding against 
a state supreme court justice who had taken part in a Working Families 
Party (WFP) phone bank and attended a WFP screening meeting at which 
the endorsements of candidates for both judicial and nonjudicial offices 
were considered.206  The court of appeals held that the restrictions promoted 
the compelling interests in judicial impartiality and independence, and pub-
lic confidence in the judiciary.  Rejecting the approach taken by the federal 
district court, the state court of appeals concluded that 
[p]recisely because the State has chosen election as one means of selecting 
judges, there is a heightened risk that the public, including litigants and the bar, 
 
200 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1040 (2002). 
201 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74, 80-81 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).  The Second Circuit vacated the de-
cision on grounds that the district court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction due 
to an ongoing state disciplinary proceeding, as per Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  
351 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004). 
202 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 74, 80-81. 
203 Id. at 91-92. 
204 Id. at 88-89. 
205 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). 
206 Id. at 1288. 
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might perceive judges as beholden to a particular leader or party after they as-
sume judicial duties.  The political activity rules are carefully designed to alle-
viate this concern by limiting the degree of involvement of judicial candi-
dates . . . without unduly burdening the candidates’ ability to participate in 
their own campaigns.207 
The Spargo court correctly noted the close connection between partisan 
activity and judicial campaigns in states with partisan judicial elections.208  
Spargo, a politically active lawyer, no doubt owed at least some of the party 
support he received in his successful elections to the bench to his work with 
the party.  Similarly, Judge Raab testified, in the case brought against him, 
that he had volunteered to work for the WFP in order to win what he con-
sidered to be a crucial endorsement in what he expected would be an uphill 
race.209  As these cases suggest, the limitations on partisan activity by judi-
cial candidates do not easily square with a system that uses a partisan ballot 
for judicial elections.  These restrictions may be particularly burdensome for 
challengers who need to demonstrate their partisan bona fides in order to 
win a party nomination—and, thus, a place on the ballot—and key en-
dorsements.  In addition to burdening the political participatory rights of the 
candidates, these restrictions may also curb judicial electoral competitive-
ness.  The Spargo court was also correct in suggesting that the sweeping ban 
on partisan activities is far broader than would be necessary to prevent im-
partiality-as-bias.  Surely, active involvement in a party would result in ac-
tual bias in just the relative handful of cases in which party leaders, party 
activists, or the political party itself are lawyers or litigants.  As Spargo con-
tended, recusal would be sufficient under those circumstances.210  Nor does 
partisan political activism constitute a pledge or precommitment to a par-
ticular course of action in a particular case.  Rather, political activity is, at 
most, akin to the announcement of views or a general statement of philoso-
phy. 
However, Spargo significantly understates the potential of partisan ac-
tivity to undermine judicial independence.  Political parties constitute a cru-
cial structural mechanism linking up elected officials within a legislative 
chamber, between chambers in the same legislature, between separate 
branches of government, and even between different levels of government.  
Parties can play an important role in the formulation of shared policies 
across different political institutions and in persuading members of the same 
party to go along with a common policy.  The Eighth Circuit put it well in 
 
207 Id. at 1292-93. 
208 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89. 
209 In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d at 1288. 
210 Spargo, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 88-89. 
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its pre-White decision upholding Minnesota’s restrictions on partisan judi-
cial activity: 
Political parties specialize in the business of electing candidates and have a 
powerful machinery for achieving that end, including large membership and 
fund-raising organizations.  Those parties are simply in a better position than 
other organizations to hold a candidate in thrall.  Moreover, because political 
parties have comprehensive platforms, obligation to a party has a great likeli-
hood of compromising a judge’s independence on a wide array of issues.  Fi-
nally, legislatures are bodies in which, for the most part, the members owe al-
legiance to a political party, not only for financial support and endorsement in 
their campaigns for office, but also for political support within the legislative 
process itself. . . . [T]he sharing of common partisan affiliation plays an inte-
gral role in enactment of legislation.  If the judiciary is then expected to review 
such legislation neutrally, a State may conclude that it is crucial that the judges 
not be beholden to a party responsible for enactment of the legislation, or to 
one that opposed it.211 
Indeed, in McConnell v. FEC the Supreme Court recently emphasized 
the particular dangers to government integrity posed by the “special rela-
tionship and unity of interest” between a political party and the elected of-
ficeholders belonging to the party.212  McConnell upheld new federal statu-
tory restrictions on donations to political parties, including donations that 
were neither solicited by candidates nor used by the party to aid specific 
candidates.  The Court recognized that due to the “close ties that candidates 
and officeholders have with their parties,” large donations to the parties run 
the risk of unduly influencing the decisions of elected officials who belong 
to those parties and of creating the appearance of such undue influence.213 
The “special relationship” between parties and officeholders that the 
Court recognized in McConnell can also threaten judicial independence by 
too closely linking judges to party leaders and the preferences of those lead-
ers, even in cases in which neither the party leaders nor the party itself are 
participating.  Judges who are politically active within their parties can 
come under pressure to conform their judicial decisions to the party line.  
So, too, judges who endorse party candidates, speak at party conventions, or 
solicit funds for party causes are likely to be perceived by the public as sub-
ject to partisan influences and, thus, unlikely to provide impartial justice in 
cases where party positions are implicated. 
This can undermine public confidence in the independence of the judi-
ciary as well.  In its reconsideration of Minnesota’s ban on partisan political 
 
211 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 876 (8th Cir. 2001). 
212 124 S. Ct. 619, 661 (2003). 
213 Id. at 665. 
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activities, on remand from the Supreme Court after White, the Eighth Cir-
cuit panel reiterated its prior analysis that the canon’s special restrictions on 
partisan activities “are aimed at forms of obligation which are more subtle 
than outright corruption, but which the state still has a compelling interest in 
avoiding in its judiciary.”214  However, the panel expressed concern that the 
argument raised by the Supreme Court—that the Announce Clause was un-
constitutional in part because it was underinclusive as it applied only to 
election campaign statements and not to earlier announcements of political 
views—might also call into question the constitutionality of some of the 
partisan activity restrictions, such as those dealing with attendance at party 
gatherings and public statements of identification with the party, which ap-
ply only during the campaign period.215  As a result, the panel remanded the 
question of the constitutionality of the partisan activity restrictions to the 
district court for further consideration.216  Ten weeks later, this decision, as 
well as the panel’s decision upholding the anti-personal solicitation canon, 
was vacated by the Eighth Circuit, which voted to rehear both issues en 
banc.217 
As I have suggested earlier, White’s argument—that restrictions on ju-
dicial statements or activity that apply only during the pre-election period 
are constitutionally suspect as underinclusive—makes little sense, because 
the pre-election period is quite distinctive, and statements made during that 
period have a special significance.  So, too, the fact that a judge may have 
been politically active before she ascended to the bench does not render par-
tisan activity restrictions on sitting judges underinclusive.  We have a long 
tradition of partisan political figures becoming distinguished nonpartisan 
judges.  Restrictions targeting judicial candidates and sitting judges appro-
priately distinguish between partisan figures and judges who are expected to 
separate themselves, while on the bench, from partisan politics. 
Restrictions on partisan political activity should be constitutional 
whether or not the state runs its judicial elections on partisan lines.  Indeed, 
partisan judicial elections do not ameliorate the threat to judicial independ-
 
214 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated 
and reh’g, en banc, granted sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-
4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004). 
215 White, 361 F.3d at 1048.  The court saw no underinclusiveness problem in restricting 
endorsements during campaigns since “[t]he endorsement clause only makes sense during the 
time-frame of an election.”  Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
10232, at *4 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004).  As of the printing of this Article, oral argument of the 
rehearing en banc was scheduled for October 20, 2004.  Notice to All Counsel:  October 18-
24, 2004, supra note 22, at 4. 
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ence; they heighten it.  Although there is a tension between providing for 
partisan elections while restricting the partisan political activities of candi-
dates, the two positions are not contradictory.  The partisan ballot line, like 
the announcement of views on disputed political and legal issues, provides 
the voter with a general sense of where the candidate stands and how the 
candidate may differ from the candidates of other parties.  In low-salience 
judicial elections, where, typically, voters will have little other information 
about the candidates, this information can be vital.  But greater political ac-
tivism links the candidate-judge ever more tightly to the party.  This may 
lead party leaders to treat judges as comparable to other party-elected of-
ficeholders and may undermine the ability of politically active judges to dis-
tance themselves from their parties when performing their judicial function.  
By forcing a measure of party-candidate distance, the political activity can-
ons reinforce the separation of powers and emphasize the significance of ju-
dicial independence.218 
CONCLUSION:  BEYOND THE CANONS 
Notwithstanding White, most of the canons regulating judicial cam-
paign activities should be able to pass constitutional muster.  As Part I 
points out, we do not have one uniform set of constitutional standards that 
govern all elections.  Rather, the rules governing such fundamental issues as 
the composition of the electorate, the weighting of votes, and restrictions on 
campaign funding can vary according to the nature of the decision to be 
made or the office to be determined by the election.  Given our mixed set of 
electoral rules, White’s unsurprising determination that the First Amend-
ment applies to judicial elections does not require that judicial elections be 
governed by the same set of campaign speech and conduct provisions as ap-
plies to elections for legislative and executive office. 
The nature of the judicial function justifies some restrictions on cam-
paign practices that would be invalid in the context of elections for legisla-
tive or executive office.  With respect to the canons that have been the pri-
mary targets of constitutional challenges in recent years, the goals of 
protecting judicial impartiality-as-open-mindedness and judicial independ-
ence ought to provide compelling justifications for prohibitions on candi-
date pledges and promises; for enforcement of a properly drafted ban on 
 
218 The constitutional case for these canons becomes stronger if, as In re Raab found, the 
precedents upholding statutes that limit the partisan political activities of public employees 
apply.  In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (citing U.S. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)); see also United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 93 (1947) (upholding the constitutionality of restrictions on 
the political activities of civil service employees). 
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statements that make commitments; and for restrictions on the candidate’s 
personal solicitation of contributions and the candidate’s partisan political 
activities.  The canon against knowing misrepresentations would probably 
be valid even when applied to nonjudicial elections and can certainly be en-
forced in judicial elections. 
Yet, it is unclear what difference the continuing constitutionality of the 
canons would make.  Many judicial election campaigns are likely to remain 
largely low-salience noncompetitive contests, with voters receiving inade-
quate information.  Judges will be subject to structural pressures to consider 
whether to abide by public opinion in high visibility cases, as well as to take 
into account the concerns of their contributors and their parties.  The differ-
ence between the announcement of views and the making of commitments 
is an important point for constitutional purposes, but it is a highly subtle one 
that may be lost on voters, litigants, and judges alike in heated campaigns.  
Moreover, once the canons are applied not simply to specific words of 
pledge or promise but to the general sense of whether campaign statements 
amount to a prejudgment, the distinction between announcements and 
commitments may be difficult to draw in particular cases.  That may make 
some candidates uncertain as to exactly what they can say and also give rise 
to dangers of arbitrary or partisan enforcement. 
Two other steps, either supplementing or supplanting the canons, might 
be useful in increasing the information available to voters, reducing the 
campaign-based pressures on judges, and facilitating robust campaign de-
bate.  First, states could provide public funding for judicial candidates.  The 
need for campaign contributions can be as great a threat to judicial imparti-
ality as statements concerning contested cases or issues.  Recent opinion 
polls have found that few people think that judicial decisions are affected by 
the content of campaign statements but that roughly three-quarters of those 
surveyed think that campaign contributions affect judicial outcomes.219  Far 
more than the ban on personal solicitation, public funding, by providing ju-
dicial candidates with a disinterested source of funds, could alleviate the 
danger that campaign contributions will bias decisions.  Further, by assuring 
candidates funding above the amounts the candidates can raise from private 
donors, public funding would increase the ability of judicial candidates to 
present themselves to the voters.  So, too, public funding can reduce the 
burdens of fundraising and increase the funds available to challengers, 
 
219 See, e.g., Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Accountability and Judicial Independence, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 144-45 (2003) (“[A]bout three-fourths of Americans believe that judicial 
outcomes are affected by campaign contributions.”); cf. Kozlowski, supra note 168, at 172 
(suggesting that these polls show massive public distrust of the judiciary). 
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thereby generally increasing electoral competitiveness.220  Indeed, better 
than any other regulatory tool, public funding could simultaneously advance 
the multiple goals of unfettered political expression, voter information, 
competitive elections, and judicial impartiality and independence.221 
North Carolina recently took a dramatic step in reconsidering its regula-
tion of judicial elections by providing for public funding for judicial elec-
tions while drastically cutting back its regulation of judicial campaign con-
duct.222  The Tarheel State now prohibits only a candidate’s solicitation of 
funds on behalf of a political party or candidate for office, endorsement of a 
candidate for nonjudicial public office, or intentionally and knowingly mis-
representing her identity or qualifications.  North Carolina no longer prohib-
its pledges, promises, commitments, personal solicitations, or other forms of 
partisan political activity.223  The new North Carolina approach, thus, fo-
cuses on promoting political expression and voter information through pub-
lic funding and the elimination of some speech restrictions, while freeing 
judicial candidates from dependence on large donors and defending the 
autonomy of the courts from partisan executive and legislative politics.  To 
be sure, the new canons permit the kinds of pledges and promises that may 
be inconsistent with the judicial function.  But the combination of public 
funding and less restrictive canons almost certainly provides greater protec-
tion for both judicial independence and informed elections than does the 
usual pattern in most states of more restrictive canons without public fund-
ing.224 
 
220 The current private funding system leads to considerable funding imbalances, with 
the better funded candidate usually prevailing against a less well-funded opponent.  See 
GOLDBERG & SANCHEZ, supra note 23, at 15 (“[T]he top fundraiser almost always wins at the 
polls.”). 
221 See generally Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 563 (1999) (discussing the benefits that public funding would have for elections 
and government).  A less dramatic but still useful way of aiding less well-funded candidates 
and increasing voter information would be through the government dissemination of voter 
guides that contain brief statements by and about the candidates.  See, e.g., Cynthia Canary, 
Know Before You Go:  A Case for Publicly Funded Voters’ Guides, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 81, 83 
(2003) (promoting state-funded voters’ guides as a means of facilitating an informed elector-
ate). 
222 North Carolina Public Campaign Fund Financing Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 
(2002) (effective 2004). 
223 N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7C (amended Apr. 2, 2004). 
224 See Phillips, supra note 219, at 146-47 (calling for public funding of judicial elec-
tions, and citing surveys finding that judges in Ohio and Texas support public funding of judi-
cial races); see also N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUB. CONFI-
DENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, WITHOUT PUBLIC CONFIDENCE, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 
COULD NOT FUNCTION 8-9 (June 28, 2004) (presenting the findings of the special commis-
sion appointed by New York’s Chief Justice Judith Kaye to promote confidence in judicial 
elections, including a recommendation for a public financing program for judicial elections), 
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Second, state supreme courts, or other bodies responsible for the im-
plementation of campaign codes, should consider shifting the enforcement 
of the pledge, promise, and commitment bans from sanctions for campaign 
statements that violate the canons to the requirement that judges recuse 
themselves from cases involving litigants or raising issues that were the sub-
jects of a campaign pledge, promise, or commitment.  This approach was 
suggested by the Missouri Supreme Court, when, in the aftermath of White, 
it issued an order that revised its canons to eliminate the Announce Clause 
but then added that “[r]ecusal, or other remedial action, may nonetheless be 
required of any judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge 
has announced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate under the 
Code of Judicial Conduct.”225 
Although requiring recusal in cases in which a judge has merely an-
nounced views may be too strong, recusal would be a desirable way to en-
force many of the restrictions on campaign speech.  Given the uncertain 
scope of the canons’ restrictions, an approach that focuses on recusal would 
better protect robust debate and avoid the dangers of arbitrary or partisan 
enforcement by assuring candidates that speech within the gray areas would 
not be subject to sanction.  This would probably benefit challengers—and 
hence competitive elections generally—as they may be less familiar with 
the rules and may also feel the need to make sharper, more dramatic state-
ments in order to get the attention of the voters.  It would also focus en-
forcement on the value threatened by certain campaign statements:  imparti-
ality. 
Intervention by way of mandatory recusal would be most appropriate 
when it appears that a campaign statement threatens to undermine the fair 
and evenhanded application of the law in a specific case.  There may be less 
need for the state supreme court or judicial conduct body to take action 
against a candidate if a judge’s strong words during a campaign are not sub-
sequently implicated in specific cases or are not followed up by biased be-
havior while on the bench.226  To be sure, more liberal recusal has its limita-
 
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ 
reports/JudicialElectionsReport.pdf. 
225 Order Enforcing Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (Mo. July 18, 2002) (en 
banc), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup/index.nsf/0/ 
f1c626db4da8b14086256bfa0073b302? (last accessed Oct. 7, 2004). 
226 Cf. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 96-97 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (Pariente, J., concur-
ring) (finding that six months’ suspension, rather than removal, was an appropritate penalty 
for violations of campaign canons where in the four years following the election the judge had 
conducted herself in an impartial manner on the bench), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 180 (2003). 
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tions and its critics, too.227  But it may be the most appropriate way of rec-
onciling judicial elections with judicial impartiality. 
That, indeed, is the dilemma for the regulation of judicial elections:  to 
protect and enhance the free speech, voter information, and electoral com-
petitiveness essential to elections while also preserving judicial impartiality-
as-open-mindedness and the courts’ structural independence of the other 
branches of government.  Judicial elections do not need to be run according 
to the same rules that apply to all other elections.  Indeed, some aspects of 
the judicial function provide strong support for special regulations appropri-
ate to the judicial setting.  White notwithstanding, most of the traditional ju-
dicial campaign canons ought to pass constitutional muster. 
But restrictions on campaign speech and political expression trench on 
constitutional values and pose considerable line-drawing difficulties, and 
enforcement may unduly involve election commissions, judicial conduct 
bodies, or courts in heated election disputes.  Other mechanisms, such as 
public funding and recusal, might do a better job of holding together the 
competing concerns that structure the judicial campaign conduct problem 
without raising the particular difficulties posed by prohibiting or penalizing 
campaign statements or actions that would be protected in other electoral 
settings. 
 
 
227 See Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add:  Nonpartisan Judicial 
Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1420 (2003) (noting that recusal only helps the liti-
gant who is aware of the judge’s past statements and who can bear the costs of litigating 
recusal); Shepard, supra note 63, at 1081-83 (detailing the costs of recusal); see also Morri-
son, supra note 136, at 743-44 (tentatively presenting recusal as an enforcement option). 
